


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**FOREIGN
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JPRS Report

Central Eurasia

Military Affairs

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Military Affairs

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ARMED FORCES

Current State of Officer Corps

94UM0415A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
17 May 94 p 1

[Article by Nikolay Poroskov: "The Army Will Be Like Its Officer Corps Will Be"]

[Text] The Army and Navy are above all the officer corps. As it will be, so will be the Armed Forces, and the course of reforms depends most of all on it. What are the officer cadres like today? They represent more than 100 nationalities and about 80 percent are Russian. About 90 percent have a higher military or specialized military education. More than 28 percent of the officers have served in their positions for less than a year.

In comparison with the beginning of last year, the number of officers in the Russian Armed Forces has declined by almost 8 percent, and the strength level of the Army and Navy was 85 percent of the required number of officer cadres (all figures were as of the beginning of 1994).

A major problem for the Army was the mass discharge of young officers up to 30 years of age. More than 95,000 of them left the Armed Forces in 1990-1993 because of the disorder and the loss of prestige in the service. People in this blossoming age accounted for one-third of those discharged last year and more than half in the Airborne Troops. About 5,000 people are at the disposal of commanding officers, commanders of different ranks—sometimes for three to six months.

Through the efforts, by no means insignificant, of the Main Directorate for the Training and Distribution of Cadres [GUPiRK] and local personnel agencies, it was possible to stop the unplanned discharge of more than 20,000 people, and there was a reduction of the number of officers going to sovereign states. By the way, of the more than 13,000 who left last year for the near abroad, [many] were young people who, as everyone knows, are inclined to heed their emotions. Many, not being able to reach the desired place, as they say, are besieging the reception room of the Ministry of Defense of Russia and the GUPiRK with requests that they be allowed to return. As a rule, such people are not accepted, with the possible exception of those who finish school not so long ago, provided that they are not motivated by mercantile considerations.

There is still one other painful problem, the discharge of officers who have reached the maximum age and who have a right to a pension. Here last year's plan was fulfilled at 81 percent, in part because the discharge of this category is more than made up for locally by the discharge of young officers. Even of the 1,400 officers sent to other ministries and departments, more than half are junior officers who turned out to be "superfluous" despite the condition of being under strength.

As of today, there are about 10,000 officers who have reached the maximum age, and about 6 percent of them have "outgrown" the limit by five years or more. If the plan for discharges is not fulfilled, then by the end of the year, in the opinion of Col.-Gen. Yevgeniy Vysotskiy, chief of the GUPiRK, almost another 12,000 will be added to the present 10,000. Of course it is necessary to maintain

experienced cadres, but without thereby forgetting about the prospects of young officers.

The condition of being under strength is partially being compensated by women—there are more than 1,500 of them in officer positions, mostly medical personnel and translators. A new source of manpower acquisition is the voluntary service of reserve officers under contract. Last year there were just 820 such volunteers, mostly specialists from the Ground Forces. Apparently a minor help in the situation will be the call-up of 15,000 reserve officers in accordance with a justified edict of the president of the Russian Federation. Even military educational institutions as a basic source of manpower acquisition can hardly fill one-fourth of the existing needs.

The enumerated problems can in part be explained by the not always smooth introduction into operation of individual statutes and articles of new laws on military questions, organizational and personnel measures, the reduction of the numerical strength of the forces, and the decline in the prestige of the individual in service. But there are also shortcomings within the Army. Many officers are dismissed from positions, primarily command and staff positions. Last year 26 commanders of brigades, regiments, and ships first rank were removed. In a number of cases, the removal took place less than a year after appointment. The reason clearly lies in the low quality of the selection process. Hence the significant costs—a worthy candidate who is not accepted, undermining of the faith of subordinates in their commander, and a worsening of results as well as expenditures in connection with the move to a new place of service and so on.

It is also reasonable to seek the reason for this phenomenon in the existing certification procedures. They were established back in 1977 and refined somewhat in 1985, but, in the opinion of the leadership of the GUPiRK, they have become obsolete. Moreover the simultaneous one-time certification of all officers will inevitably lead to elements of formalism. Work is being done to prepare new guidance on the certification of officer personnel. It will be announced by order of the minister of defense, but after the putting into effect of the Statute on the Order of the Performance of Military Service, which includes 68 articles and 8 chapters. The draft of this document has been submitted to the Government of the Russian Federation and it will also be introduced to the Duma for discussion.

Despite some expenditures and difficulties, the officer corps of the Russian Federation is gradually acquiring more definite contours. A normative-legal base has been established in principle, and the first stage in the transition to a contract system has had a positive influence on the quality of the officers. In a number of cases, it was possible to eliminate "ballast" and the system of military education that was disrupted with the collapse of the USSR has been fully restored. The second stage of its reform has begun and a list of specialties for which there is training in institutes of higher education of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation has been refined and put into effect.

Still, Col.-Gen. Mikhail Kolesnikov, chief of the General Staff, calls the situation with respect to military cadres complex and ambiguous, one that requires timely and

balanced actions. Among the directions specified for work with cadres in the longer term is the raising of professionalism, the improvement of the system for manpower acquisition and training of officers, and their social protection. But perhaps the main thing is the preservation of the officer corps, without which, I repeat, there is no Army.

POLICY

Budget Cuts Causing 'Destruction' of Army, Navy

PM2005153094 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 20 May 94 p 1

[Ivan Ivanyuk report: "An Army Without Housing, Weapons, or Hope. That Is the Possible Result of Budget Cuts"]

[Text] Recently our newspaper has repeatedly addressed the problem of financing defense expenditure. We have done this by no means out of corporate or lobby interests, but because we are convinced that only a profoundly indifferent and incompetent person could stand by and observe the way in which, on the pretext of demilitarizing the country and converting military production, the actual destruction of the Army and Navy and simultaneously of the economy itself is taking place.

Why of the economy? Because once again the idea that all economic matters can be rectified at the Armed Forces' expense is being trotted out. In the four years in which politicians and economists have diligently put it into effect, this idea has become fairly decrepit and has brought no improvements to people's lives. And, although expressed in 1990 prices, the military budget has "slimmed down" to half its size, the situation both in the Army and the economy has deteriorated.

It would seem to be high time to abandon this approach toward budget procurements and to look at things realistically. But this kind of enthusiasm cannot be observed in our economic departments. It is much easier to cross out one figure on paper and put down another—slightly smaller—one than, say, to properly organize tax collection so that the budget's income element increases rather than catastrophically decreases. Thus, according to Economy Ministry data, in the first quarter the federal budget received 3.4 trillion rubles [R] less than expected in taxes and dues. Naturally, the Finance Ministry never has any money.

Furthermore, financing military expenditure only to the extent that the empty treasury purse is filled, as has been the practice recently, is also directly damaging the country's economy. For this reason, the Russian Federation Defense Ministry Military Budget and Financing Main Directorate has estimated that nonproduction expenditure in 1993 totaled R870 billion, which again required an increase in the defense budget.

How is this sum made up? The Defense Ministry was forced to pay over R490 billion because scheduled deadlines for paying for ordered output were broken, bank credits obtained by supplier enterprises and included in the cost of military output came to R306 billion, penalties for late payment for transport services totaled R37 billion....

In the past year the financing of the draft Russian Federation Law "On the State Budget for 1994," which preserves the level of defense expenditure proposed by the government, has created a ludicrous situation in the Army and Navy. The sum of R37.1 trillion represents a mere 42 percent of the requirement, and this money could be enough only to pay personnel. There can be no question of paying the defense complex, building housing, etc. In short, this sum cannot actually be apportioned to sections of the military budget. Therefore, it has never been seriously discussed. At one time the Finance Ministry officially evaluated the draft military budget at R55.5 trillion.

Even this compromise level of appropriations, enabling the Army to survive somehow, requires considerable adjustment of the state defense order approved by the Russian Federation Government in December, including for housing for servicemen, not to mention a reduction of the range and volume of weapons and equipment being purchased. The military budget is now 60 percent "social" in its structure, and further cuts in it will inevitably hit people who as it is do not have sufficient guarantees regarding their daily lives. In these conditions the Russian Federation Government, without coordinating with the Defense Ministry, is submitting to the Duma a draft law on suspending a number of articles of the Law on the Status of Servicemen, and is attempting to abolish privileges which have existed since prewar times. How is this to be viewed?

If we closely analyze what makes up the remaining 40 percent of defense expenditure, it is evident that it contains a considerable volume of enforced expenditure not directly associated with military activity. Over R3 trillion, for example, is required for the withdrawal of troops from foreign countries near and far and for providing them with amenities in a new location. It requires considerable expenditure to maintain a state of emergency in "hot spots" and to carry out peacekeeping activity within the former USSR. The military budget is being used to maintain space centers, the air traffic safety service, hydrographic and air navigation services, lighthouses, and much else that not only the Armed Forces but the entire country needs. After all, this comes to trillions of rubles, and an adjustment for them should also be made in the budget.

But, even taking the annual budget of R37.1 trillion, the Defense Ministry is not currently being given the full volume of funding—as of 15 May it had already received R4.5 trillion less than it should have. While the military department owed a total of R6 trillion for the period January-April. An impressive figure, it cannot be denied. But this is not what gives rise to serious alarm—the lack of resources makes it impossible to properly prepare compounds for winter and transport all the essentials to Far North areas. Operational and combat training of troops and maintenance of the material base and military equipment are being disrupted.

Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin has repeatedly drawn the attention of the government and parliamentarians to the fact that it is necessary to find a solution regarding this year's budget without harming the country's defense capability. But his instruction of 3 March 1994 has still not been implemented. On 6 May the president supported an amendment to the draft budget made by the

State Duma Defense Committee and envisaging an increase of the "National Defense" item to R55 trillion.

One wants to believe that this figure will find support among State Duma deputies when the federal budget is finally approved. This level of appropriations will not, of course, solve all the Armed Forces' problems, but at least it will make it possible to avoid many minor and major misfortunes which are knocking increasingly loudly at the door....

Failure of Reform, High Command Corruption, Inefficiency Asserted

94UM0422A Moscow MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLET
in Russian 22 Apr 94 p 2

[Article by Colonel Stanislav Baratynov, a Russian officer: "When the Generals Are Bluffing: The Financial Mafia is Making Millions From the Military Budget"]

[Text] For a long time now the highest officials in the Russian Ministry of Defense have been vigorously assuring our society that military reform is proceeding at full pace. But then again, the marasmus is gaining strength. Judging by everything, they have even managed to make a fool of the president himself, the supreme commander-in-chief. In his message to the Federal Assembly, Boris Yeltsin gave quite high marks to the course of Armed Forces reform which cheered up the highest Russian generals. One of the key ideologues of military reform, Assistant Minister of Defense for Military Policy Lieutenant-General Gennadiy Ivanov, officially stated at a press conference that Yeltsin's very positive response on the course of military reform attests to the "correctness of the path selected by us". But then it has not been excluded that the positive presidential response on reform was also prepared in the bowels of the Ministry of Defense, and that General Ivanov himself had far from the last participation in it.

Let's pose the question this way: Does Yeltsin know about the state of military reform? As a General Staff officer who worked quite a bit in its structures, as an official who is often in the troops and who is well acquainted practically with all of the information that affects the assessments of the state of combat readiness of the Army, I dare to assure you with all responsibility that the supreme commander-in-chief knows exactly as much about the state of affairs in the Armed Forces as the minister of defense and his closest entourage want him to.

General Pavel Grachev at one time admitted that he contacts Yeltsin on a daily basis at a strictly determined time and reports the most recent and the most important things which occurred in the Army. (Let it be on the minister of defense's conscience that he doesn't always manage to do that—it has happened that he has been unable to reach the president for three-four days).

And now imagine that Grachev day after day reports the same thing to Yeltsin: combat training of ground troops and naval forces is being disrupted everywhere. The moral-psychological state of personnel is declining. Theft of arms and ammunition is not ceasing. Money is not being issued to personnel in a timely manner, and because of that strikes are already beginning in units. Nearly 60 percent of the combat pilots have long ago forgotten what it is to fly systematically. Plans to introduce housing for homeless

servicemen are not being carried out. New combat equipment is practically not entering the troops and the fleets. Scientific and experimental design work has been reduced to 10-15 percent. And so on and so forth.

We would all need to be too naive, and the minister of defense too bold for us to be able to believe that. Grachev understands very well: if he day in and day out honestly confessed all of this to the president, the quick-tempered Boris Nikolayevich would take it up one day and would not mince words: if everything is falling apart in the Army, why does it need you in the role of minister? Only both of them: know precisely how and in what form Pavel Sergeyevich reports to Boris Nikolayevich. But we already know for certain what the supreme commander-in-chief's opinion is on the state of combat readiness of his Army. In that same (already half-forgotten) message to the Federal Assembly, he suddenly arrived at the conclusion that the combat readiness of the Armed Forces is at a level that permits it to reliably ensure Russia's military security. It's easy to guess who led the president to a conclusion that is so dreadful in its unfairness. There's no doubt that it was first and foremost he who is directly responsible for the Army's combat readiness. On this score, I will say in passing that it would be good to have an article on false reporting of progress on an especially large scale (from 10 to 15) in our Criminal Code. In order to realistically judge the true state of combat readiness of the Army and Navy, it would be sufficient for the clerks from the presidential staff to request restricted analytical documents and report back materials from the Main Military Inspectorate in which they would discover, to their great horror, a conclusion that only 1-2 divisions in each military district and only 1-2 ships in each fleet are combat ready today! And that is the main and most honest conclusion on the primary result of military reform. And based upon it, now judge the "correctness of the path selected by us" which both the minister of defense and his court theoretician of military structural development so stubbornly attempt to convince their fellow countrymen.

The combat readiness of the Army is a state category. And he who thoroughly deceives his own people with regard to its actual state is certainly committing a state crime. But who today could place an objective report on the actual state of the Armed Forces and on the results of reform on the desks of the president, the chairman of the Council of Ministers, and the chairmen of both houses of parliament? I can boldly dare to assure you—no one. And this is why.

Approximately two-three years ago "democratically minded" political figures and people's deputies aggressively spread the conclusion that the so-called Ministry of Defense Main Inspectorate was incapable of objectively assessing the level of combat readiness of ground troops and naval forces because it is organizationally part of the military department, and is directly subordinate to the minister of defense who, naturally, is to a considerable extent an interested party. And that was the absolute truth. I personally have repeatedly had the opportunity to participate in the work of teams of main inspectors in military districts and groups of forces, and to write report back and analytical documents. The results of the inspection depended to a very large extent, for example, on how we were received in the military district or group of forces,

how the personal relations of the minister of defense and the commanding general or main inspector had developed, and what quantity of boxes, with all kinds of gifts from those being inspected, the inspectors transported back to Moscow.

There are many "interesting" episodes in my memory. For example, at the beginning of the 1980's, a team of Ministry of Defense inspectors traveled to Germany with the undisguised mission of replacing Group of Soviet Forces in Germany Commander-in-Chief General of the Army Ivanovskiy. Few people knew at that time that on the eve of our trip Yevgeniy Filippovich had "poorly received" the marshal-inspector, his wife, and children for rest. Therefore, the inspection was excessively strict, and the result of it was that Ivanovskiy and Group Political Directorate Chief General Ivan Mednikov were removed at practically the same moment. It is an altogether different matter when the commanding general prepares beforehand, say, a collection of precious stones. In the Far East they sent entire teams of explosives experts into the mountains to extract them. After summing up the results of the inspection, each inspector received large amounts of red caviar and smoked fish.

Once they surreptitiously handed the chairman of an inspection team an enormous unique coral for which the fleet's best scuba divers dove into the depths of the sea. As was customary, they carried an identical gift to Moscow for the minister of defense (an inspection gift for the minister was considered to be an unwritten law for many, many years). Of course, all of the primary combat readiness assessments of the inspected formations and units had to depend on the quantity and quality of the gifts, the generosity of the tables that were set three times a day, the content of the so-called cultural program (fishing, hunting, swimming in unique sources, baths, saunas, and visiting the families of the commanders being inspected where "by chance" there frequently turned out to be single women and also married garrison women, and, after a certain amount of contact with them, an inspector did not really want to write in the inspection report that not one of the company's tanks had hit the target...).

An off-color Army anecdote even existed on this score. A not completely sober inspector says to the regimental commander in the morning:

The battalion is satisfactory but the company is unsatisfactory!

The regimental commander quickly determined what was wrong with the inspector and poured into a glass:

And now the battalion is satisfactory and the company is outstanding!

And when active conversations occurred that General of the Army Konstantin Kobets as the main military inspector would allegedly be directly subordinate to the president, it became clear that now the Ministry of Defense anticipates difficult times. But the music played for a short time. "Having hung around" for a period of time in an undetermined state, Kobets with the entire inspectorate was returned to the native bosom of the

Ministry of Defense, and is directly subordinate to Grachev. Moreover, Yeltsin also assigned Kobets as deputy minister of defense.

Well, judge for yourselves. Say Kobets traveled to inspect a military district. He brought back a grade of two from there. Naturally, Grachev is unhappy. How do you report that to the president? Naturally, they talked. Naturally, they agreed on the fact that "individual shortcomings" exist. And that is already easier—where aren't there individual shortcomings now? Therefore, should we report them that way? Order. Let's also assure you that "we are at the guaranteed level". And if it isn't guaranteed, Boris Nikolayevich will remove them.

Matters are being reduced to extraordinarily strange things. Today, it is being announced that the Northern Fleet is the best in the Russian Navy, but tomorrow practically all of the mass media report that the wives of military seamen have gone on strike and have blocked the runways: their husbands are not being paid on time, they are not being provided with apartments, the apartment buildings are cold, and there is nothing to buy in the stores. And the combatant commanders themselves say that recognition of the fleet as the best in the Navy—is blasphemy.

You only reflect: it was named the best, and, therefore, the most combat ready, not the vegetable store, but the entire fleet, the Russian strategic combat unit. And you would read what the reports from the fleet say about the state of combat ships and coastal facilities, about reserves and the availability of fuel-lubricants and other materials. It's no accident that one submarine commander bitterly joked: "It will soon reach the point if just one ship from our fleet leaves the quay—they will then recognize the fleet as the best...".

In the Ministry of Defense Main Military Inspectorate they know very well precisely what criteria are being utilized to determine the combat readiness of a military district or fleet. Minister of defense and chief of the general staff special orders or directives have long existed on this score. Naturally not only the main inspectorate, but also the commander-in-chief directorates of the services of the Armed Forces must be strictly guided by these criteria. But what actually happens? I visited the Pacific Fleet last year on an inspection trip with the deputy commander-in-chief. And, suddenly, soon after that we read in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA that the fleet's combat readiness will largely be assessed based upon the results of the live firing... of just one ship which the admiral visited. Well that's a fine how-do-you-do! For such a "criterion" to be more understandable for a civilian reader, I will say that this is practically the same as arriving at a conclusion about the normal state of both arms and legs based upon one finger.

But that shouldn't happen. Whom are we deceiving? Ourselves. One general even contrived to use a word like "nedoboyegotovka" [not quite combat ready] while talking about the criteria of the state of combat readiness of a division in the troops subordinate to him. This is something like "nedoberemenna" [not quite pregnant] or "nedoubita" [not quite killed]. Today, as never before, an epidemic of gigantic false reporting of progress and lies has swept over the Army. The generals inspect themselves, they assign grades to themselves, they themselves develop

the criteria of the state of the troops and fleets, and they themselves ignore them, if they see that the state of affairs does not reach even a primitive "three".

General Konstantin Kobets' main military inspectorate has actually been transformed into a well trained and devoted dog of the minister of defense. It can vigilantly protect his peace or subordinates who are sympathetic to him can "bite" those being fined. Recently PVO [Air Defense] Commander-in-Chief, Colonel-General Viktor Prudnikov "had the gall" to notify the former Supreme Soviet that the air border defense system is dying due to the Ministry of Defense's inaction and its conciliatory position. The matter at times reached the point where foreign and Russian aircraft that were flying, say, from a Westerly direction had already nearly penetrated to the skies near Moscow. And what about the minister? Not only did he severely criticize the PVO commander-in-chief, he also appointed an investigation. It's clear—that it was appointed to remove the garbage from the "Arbat Hut". Rumors are already circulating that Prudnikov will soon leave his post and will move to another, less visible post. And, of course, "according to his own desires".

And in the background of this state of affairs in the Army, General Grachev and his team are furiously whispering into the president's ear that reforms in the Army are proceeding at full speed. And with each passing month this lie is being increasingly and more obviously transformed into a means of survival of the generals in their high posts. Of course, these are not the generals who courageously placed the barrel of their pistols to their temples when it became obvious that their troops are not combat ready or when they learned that they had been totally misled in the assessments of the state of affairs. In my opinion, they themselves are sooner ready to give the pistol to settle scores with the lives of those who suddenly detect that a gigantic deception is being created and whose conscience is beginning to torment them.

Let's pose a simple and clear question: what are the specific results of military reform after its first stage? The father of military reform, General Ivanov, and the minister of defense always begin by saying: first of all the Ministry of Defense was created. Maybe they built a new building? Did they lay thousands of lines of communication? Did they select new staffs? Did they purchase furniture or electronic equipment? Of course not! They obtained all of this—durable capital—in enormous quantities from the old Soviet Ministry of Defense. So, where is the matter right now, just where is reform? And it turns out that reform is limited to replacing blank forms, stamps, and name plates from offices, redrawing the diagram of the organization of the military department, altering the names of certain directorates and departments, and rewriting functional duties. Perhaps that's all. But then again, how loudly it sounds—"the Ministry of Defense was created".

And later the most ordinary chaos began which both General Grachev himself and his closest subordinate today call reform. They all have repeatedly asserted that the Army will be reduced, and, therefore, the Ministry of Defense itself will be reduced. And at the same time the number of Grachev's assistants has increased to seven, and the authorized strength of the military department has

increased by approximately a factor of 1.5. The number of generals on the ministry's floors has also increased. It has reached the point where general's ranks have even been awarded to those who were in colonel's positions. General's shoulder boards have even been donned on a man who is responsible for the electric light bulbs and carpeting, the decanters and toilet paper.

Sometimes you get the impression that Grachev and his assistants are playing at reform of the Ministry of Defense staff. And how can you say otherwise if the names and functional duties of many directorates and departments have been changed from three to five times, their chiefs have been replaced, and the transfers of enormous masses of people from offices to offices have been carried out over the course of one and a half years. The missions of some structures have been transferred to others, then the missions have been returned, again "taken away", and later it suddenly turned out that two and sometimes three directorates or departments were involved with one and the same issues. And so on—without end. That leapfrogging has laid additional financial burdens on the military department, and, based upon the simplest calculations, has cost the taxpayers many millions of rubles. And, judging by everything, a new spiral of organizational-staff leapfrogging awaits the ministry already in the near future.

The Ministry of Defense leadership, while attempting to pass off the desired as the actual, quite often resorts to primitive ruses that are calculated for simpletons. For example, the reduction of the Army is being passed off as one of the key directions of reform. Grachev and company also often place this process in the same rank with the so-called "results" of military reform. But why make fools of the people? The reduction of the Army is a process that goes without saying. Hundreds of thousands of officers and warrant officers are leaving the Army based upon years served, according to their own desires, or due to illness. And many, putting it mildly, "are leaving". So where is reform here? Here for some reason I'm reminded of the episode of a story where a bureaucrat, who didn't have anything to report back to the leadership on the work completed, wrote in the report: "Organized the onset of evening".

Take any strategic direction of military reform and you will see that the state of affairs there is extremely insignificant. Yes, for instance, the lack of budget resources for manning of the troops with contract personnel which both the minister, his deputies and his assistants love to boast about. From the very beginning, it was clear that the introduction of contract service in the current situation of financial starvation was the purest folly. Initially, R6 billion (prices at the end of 1992) was allocated for 100,000 contract personnel. Already a year and a half later it has become clear that inflation is literally gobbling up this sum before our very eyes. It has been barely enough to pay the salaries of contract personnel. And it was contemplated that they would be provided separate housing or a dormitory with all of the comforts, that their work day would be standardized, and that they would have quite a few advantageous social benefits. It has turned out that all of this is once again a lie. People don't even have the opportunity to bathe with hot water. And they are writing many letters of complaint to the president and to the minister about how

they were grossly misled. Deception has become an integral element of military reform because it sort of compensates for its absence.

Today, the Army has barely enough money to pay the salaries of personnel. It's no accident that they say when Chief of the General Staff Colonel-General Kolesnikov, during his meeting with students of the General Staff Academy, was asked by the students which of the Army's missions does he consider to be most important under current conditions, he flabbergasted everyone with his brief answer: "To survive!"

Not only that but also many other examples attest to the fact that military reform is becoming increasingly covered with the dirt of immorality. Many honest generals and officers of the Ministry of Defense and General Staff treat with great caution, for example, that "secret chemistry" which is being created in the issues of financing the troops. Ministry of Defense Main Directorate for the Military Budget and Financing Chief Colonel-General Vasilii Vorobyev was recently compelled to frankly admit a number of devastating facts. Here is just one of them. R3 million that had left Moscow for the Northwestern Group of Forces has been lost no one knows where for approximately 1.5 years. Something similar was repeated several months later but with a much larger sum. Experts have calculated that during the time when the military money "traveled around the world" it could be circulated from three to six times and receive a profit that totals tens of millions of at that time "wooden rubles". General Vorobyev bemoans the fact and sighs. He said these are the procedures that we have! The main military financier tries to prove that he aggressively looked for the money and wrote dozens of letters. But that, in my personal view, was only a false imitation of concern. They didn't try too hard to find the money, allowing it to circulate even more. Because with the sincere desire to "find tails", both the minister and his treasurer could have put, as they say, the investigators on their ears and could have closed the case in a month maximum. But that did not occur. And in the ministry they are already openly talking about the fact that **A CERTAIN FINANCIAL MAFIA EXISTS THAT CIRCULATES MILLIONS FROM THE MILITARY BUDGET AND FOR SOME REASON THOSE WHO SHOULD ARE NOT RUSHING TO SORT THAT OUT.**

No matter which sphere of military reform you poke with your finger, you see lies, hypocrisy, deception and the powerlessness of our highest military leadership everywhere which is attempting to put up a bold front. For example, the minister of defense quite recently announced to the entire world that the housing problem in the Army will be resolved already in 1996. Who convinced him of the possibility of doing that—is unknown.

The concept of military reform was publicized in 1992 and they divided it into three primary stages. But Military Structural Development and Reform Directorate Chief General Ivanov is already announcing some sort of new variants of structural development of the Russian Army after 1995. And where then do you hide the previously approved "general plan" of military structural development? You can't make heads or tails of it. Sometimes we in the General Staff get the impression that not staid generals are involved with military reform but children who do not

know what they should do with the complex electronic toy. But it's no accident that one of the deputy ministers of defense was recently compelled to frankly call all of this the "the triviality of dilettantes".

STRATEGIC DETERRENT FORCES

Travails of ICBM Regiment Relocated From Belarus to Mariy El

94P50149A Moscow MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLET
in Russian 21 Apr 94 p 1

[Yuliya Khaytina article: "For Each Enemy—One 'Topol.' Missile Regiment on Combat Alert."]

[Text] After saying farewell to Belorussia, the RS-12M mobile intercontinental nuclear missiles, customarily called simply "Topols" [poplar trees], along with their support systems, have arrived home in Russia—in a division in Yoshkar-Ola. Col Vladimir Kashkin's missile regiment, having gotten off combat alert duty, was not part of our military forces which were serving with the 43d Missile Army in Ukraine and which were moved out of there by the sensitive local leadership, taking nothing with them: All military property now belongs to Ukraine.

The system of barriers at the "missile corner" where the Topols are located is very inhospitable to those not authorized to be there. For example, the so-called electrified zone looks like a sort of spiny network, through which at regular intervals an approximately 1500-volt current flows.

Officers and noncommissioned officers service the Topols. This gives them the modest right to call themselves Strategic Missile Forces professionals. For good service, an officer with the rank of major can earn 300 thousand rubles a month—they get money for food, for keeping up appearances, for shift duty, and for other good things in life. In view of the fact that most men in military service do not have apartments and do not expect to have them any time soon, but do have plenty of unemployed wives and hungry children, one can say happily that our great Motherland's nuclear shield is in the hands of enthusiasts!

But fortunately the country is poor and the Defense Ministry poorer, while an officer is a sort of father in a subsistence economy. He must not only service the missiles, but in his "free time"—as if he had any—he must build a barracks, mess hall, and so on. Their desperate wives stubbornly work as communications officers, dispatchers, and so on, and proudly contribute their 150 thousand rubles to the family budget. There are 108 of them in Vladimir Kashkin's regiment—almost the entire communications and medical staff.

Vladislav Zotin, president of the Republic of Mariy El, after he attended the above-mentioned ceremony, felt so sincerely about "his" military men that he thought that the best way to prevent bad consequences in the missile forces was to visit personally the General Staff in Moscow. He asked for more generous financing so that the forces could be at normal strength. As to whether the presidential travels will help the missile troops—who knows, but his travels have made them feel more friendly towards their commanders.

Commentary on SS-25 Regiment

944D0010B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
21 Apr 94 p 1

[Article by Aleksandr Dolinin of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA: "Another Regiment Equipped With 'Topol' Missiles on Combat Alert Duty"]

[Text] *As has already been reported in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, three missile regiments armed with the RS-12M Topol mobile missile systems have joined the force composition of the Strategic Rocket Forces [RVSN]. These are replacing those removed from duty earlier in strict conformity with international agreements.*

The regiment commanded by Colonel Vladimir Kashkin is stationed in Yoshkar-Ola. It entered combat alert duty on April 19. Our correspondents report on this event.

Division commander Major-General Musa Tsechoyev relates that this is not the first rearmament in the 30-year history of the formation, which is now armed with RS-12 (SS-13) and RS-12M (SS-25) missiles. But this one is a special event, since it is taking place in difficult times for the country.

The new regiment was formed almost two years ago. It was manned partly with servicemen who had come from Belarus and Ukraine. There was much work to do. They had to get set up. The combat position required was a new one, but there were no funds to speak of.

"We are working in debt today," said the chief of the UNR [Directorate of the Chief of Operations], Colonel Aleksandr Katyukhin, "we have taken on two billion in debt at the bank."

The missile troops themselves took up the shovels, but the main thing was to learn the hardware that they would be receiving. The three-month practice at the proving ground at Mirnyy was a real test. It concluded with a special tactical exercise that was rated as "good."

The president and head of the government of the Republic of Mariy El, Vladislav Zotin, and the assistant commander-in-chief of the RVSN for indoctrination, Major-General Nikolay Moroz, visited the formation on the day they went onto combat alert duty.

The president answered a question about what the attitude of the strategic missile troops to the republic is by saying, "Most respectful. We have good, businesslike relations."

The first to enter combat alert duty along with the commander were Lieutenant-Colonel Anatoliy Nazarov, Majors Aleksandr Dubovik, Aleksandr Bolgarskiy, Captain Aleksandr Rudkin, Senior Lieutenant Igor Bachev, Warrant Officer Elvira Volkova... They possibly did not think that their taking of their combat posts would go down in history.

It was no accident that Deputy Regimental Commander Lieutenant-Colonel Vitaliy Lezhanin distributed historic information on the Guards Red Banner Akhtyr-Aleksandriya Orders of Kutuzov and Bogdan Khmel'nitskiy Regiment to the correspondents—a large portion of the officers from the reinforcements had served in it. This

had been a Hussar regiment at one time under the command of Denis Davydov, in which Lermontov and Alyabev had served... The unit also won honor in the Great Patriotic War. Its battle standard and orders are now in the Central Museum of the Armed Forces.

"For some reason," the missile troops puzzled, "we are easily able to part with legendary history, and are creating a new regiment. It is as if we are starting with a clean slate."

It would perhaps be fair to preserve the honored name for the new, Topol regiment, for which everything lies ahead.

GROUND TROOPS**Main Directorate Chief on Combat Training**

PM2605105794 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 25 May 94 p 2

[Interview with Colonel General Anatoliy Golovnev, chief of the Main Directorate for Combat Training and deputy commander in chief of the Ground Forces, by Colonel Gennadiy Miranovich; date and place not given: "A State's Might Is Also Measured by the Level of Its Army Training"]

[Text] From KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's files: Anatoliy Andreyevich Golovnev. Born Smolensk Oblast 1942. Graduated from the Moscow Higher Combined Arms Command College (1963), and the M.V. Frunze (1973) and General Staff (1980) Military Academies. He has served in various command and staff positions. In August 1992 he moved from his job as first deputy commander of Moscow Military District to be appointed chief of the Main Directorate for Combat Training and deputy commander in chief of the Ground Forces.

[Miranovich] Anatoliy Andreyevich, the Main Directorate for Combat Training is, it seems to me, the "lawmaker" when it comes to training specialists on various types of weapons. At least that was the case in the Soviet Army. Or are things different now?

[Golovnev] Fortunately, the procedure of disparaging our Soviet past (something which some of the mass media have had some success at) has left Armed Forces combat training—clearly, a little-known area to the writing fraternity—virtually untouched.

As before, we are elaborating draft field manuals and general military regulations along with a program for training officers and noncommissioned officers from various combat arms, and we are cooperating closely with combat training organs in the Navy, Air Defense Forces, the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] troops, and the Border Guards.... In short, the Main Directorate for Combat Training is a kind of coordination center for scientific and methodological ideas and developments in the combat training sphere. Services from the Russian Ministry for Emergency Situations, various scientific research institutes, and military academies—including the General Staff Academy—actively cooperate with us. Training in the Commonwealth countries' armies is virtually based on our developments.

Such a role for our directorate is dictated by life itself. The organizational development of a new army, the changing of doctrinal views of the nature of modern warfare, the creation of force and troop groupings to meet that challenge, and the new priorities in military-technical policy all require a reinterpretation of certain canons of combat training.

For instance, we have never before faced the problem of training units for peacekeeping forces. Naturally, we had neither the relevant training programs nor the training base. Now, as you are aware, we are fully tackling this issue. And not without success.

[Miranovich] Which is something, regrettably, that cannot be said of the Ground Forces as a whole, most of whose combined and other units posted only satisfactory results in the last training year. And other branches of the Armed Forces have not turned in a brilliant performance, but put it bluntly.

[Golovnev] You are right there. But, given that this is no worse than in 1992, when Russia announced the creation of its own Armed Forces, and that the process of the decline in the standard of combat training has nonetheless been halted, then.... Incidentally, for me to predict some kind of breakthrough in this area in the very near future would be, at the very least, unprofessional.

[Miranovich] As KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's mailbag shows, many people see one of the reasons for what we could call the ailing state of combat training in our Army as being that it is by no means looked upon as a priority everywhere. Yet the regulations of the Russian Federation Armed Forces' Internal Service—in whose elaboration you participated, incidentally—stated that combat training "is the main component of the everyday activity of servicemen in peacetime." It also stipulates that proceedings will be instituted against commanders (chiefs) guilty of taking personnel away from exercises. What can you say about this?

[Golovnev] Do you think that officers just take personnel away from exercises at their own discretion? Yes, there are cases when personal interests hamper some people in the performance of their duties. And they receive a principled assessment—as provided for by the regulations. I can name a number of officers who have paid a high price for this.

But let's call a spade a spade—the reason why personnel are taken out of planned combat training is primarily due to manpower levels, which compel commanders to divert considerable amounts of forces and resources to ensure the everyday activity of combined and other units. The destruction of existing economic ties has sharply complicated the organization of material provision for the training process. The quality of training is suffering owing to the untimely elaboration and delivery by the Ministry of the Defense Industry of simulators for new types of weapons and equipment. And the cost of training has been rising considerably, since we have been forced to use equipment already in service.

How soon will the situation change for the better? That depends on how soon we all agree that a state's might is also measured by the level of its Army training.

[Miranovich] Would anyone really take issue with that?

[Golovnev] It is hard to take issue with it. Consequently, we have no shortage of statesmen who have been campaigning—like Vladimir Shumeyko, speaker of the Federal Assembly's upper house, has been doing in your newspaper (the 5 April issue—G.M.)—for the "Army to have everything as a priority."

But stating the truth is not enough. Army training and, consequently, the might of the fatherland will not improve because of that. The situation will change depending on how soon the state can bring the Armed Forces up to full strength. We need to be talking today not simply about replenishing the thinning Army ranks with illiterate workers and peasants or "ignoramuses" who had never studied or worked anywhere before being drafted. It is a question of the need to revive the intellectual level of the barracks, which is now lower in this country than in the United States and some other NATO countries. And that, you understand, will take more than just one draft intake. And not only the draft intake....

A great deal will depend on how soon we introduce a viable organizational and staffing structure for combined and other units. On how soon our financing stops being dependent on all kinds of chance circumstances. On how soon viable logistical subunits appear in the forces. And so on and so forth.

In no way does this mean that we, the military, are beyond reproach. We also need to look at how responsible and conscientiously we approach the task in hand, how enterprising we are, and so forth. Incidentally, commanders have now been given a free hand, they are being allowed to plan the training process with an eye to local conditions.

It is time to seriously deal with the problems of combat training within the framework of moral and psychological backup for Armed Forces activity.

[Miranovich] Incidentally, this was intensively discussed at the scientific and theoretical conference held recently at the General Staff Academy.

[Golovnev] Yes, we need questing in this area. For well-known reasons we currently, as before, have no powerful ideological backup for combat training. At the same time, we need to somehow highlight such philosophical and moral values as the conviction of the need for a strong Russian state, and the understanding that military men cannot make such a clear impact anywhere in peacetime as they can in combat training.

[Miranovich] Perhaps we should learn from the West? After all, many armies have already been through what we are currently experiencing.

[Golovnev] A great deal has changed in our relationships with Western armies, including NATO armies. We have more contact. For instance, last year students from the United States and France visited the Moscow Combined Arms College. Students from the St. Petersburg Higher Combined Arms Command College hosted their counterparts from Belgium, and are now getting ready to travel there themselves on an exchange. Officers from Sweden are studying in a number of our academies. There are also direct contacts with the troops. The most vivid example is

probably the exercises due in June between the headquarters of our 27th Motorized Rifle Division and the U.S. 3d Infantry Division—preparations for which are now actively in hand.

What does this experience show? It can be said that the general trend in Armed Forces combat training in the leading states is now to reduce (the figures are cited—G.M.) the number of large-scale exercises and maneuvers involving actual forces.

We are striving to do the same thing. For instance, we now plan no more than two exercises a year with companies and battalions. One of those will be a live-fire exercise. Regimental and divisional exercises are not held annually, as used to be the case, but biennially. But....

Whereas, so to speak, we have been forced into this, the NATO Joint Armed Forces command has different motives. It prefers to resolve many traditional training tasks and to study the questions of training and warfare under new geostrategic conditions using automated battlefield modeling systems. How effective are they? Judge for yourselves—the use of automated battlefield modeling terminals at fixed-site and field command and control centers and during the U.S. "Certain Caravan" exercises in Europe made it possible to carry out large-scale military operations involving around 200,000 servicemen and more than 25,000 units of armored equipment.

[Miranovich] Do we have nothing similar?

[Golovnev] What is annoying is that we do [to-to i obidno, chto yest]. Our laser firing and engagement simulators [lazernyye imitatory strelby i porazheniya] have proved their worth superbly. They make it possible to simulate fire from tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and small arms, and to record "kills" on both sides in two-sided field training exercises. But for all this to work and for the reduction in the number of very costly live-fire exercises (figures for 1991 cited—G.M.) not to be to the detriment of troop training, we need a comprehensively automated tactical training system.

The Americans use such a system at their specialized training centers. We also have one in the pipeline, so to speak. With its help the training process could be made immeasurably cheaper. But, once again, it all depends on money.

[Miranovich] Anatoliy Andreyevich, the retargeting of the Armed Forces—if I can put it that way—to focus on resolving the new tasks stemming from the new military-political, geostrategic, and other realities will require, apart from anything else, a corresponding theoretical basis for their training. For instance, special tactical leadership had

to be developed for the joint command-post exercise between Russian and U.S. peacekeeping forces to which you referred. And what about our field manuals, which are also probably obsolete, and other documents regulating troop training? After all, different types of training are clearly needed for men in ordinary divisions and peacekeeping divisions, for new recruits and experienced specialists, for men entering service under contract, and for women....

[Golovnev] Yes, our current field manuals have been in operation since 1989. But I would not say that they were hopelessly outdated. After all, changes in tactics are, as is well known, the result of certain breakthroughs in technical development, and are a kind of reaction to certain innovations in armed combat systems. If we proceed on this basis, then the current manuals can still be used for training—which is, indeed, what practice shows. At the same time, directives have been issued making certain clarifications connected with Armed Forces reform and the change of normative acts on defense issues—specifically to Part I (divisions, brigades, regiments) of the Ground Forces Field Manual. The chapters entitled "Foundations of the Soviet Military Doctrine" and "Political Work" have been removed from the manual. A chapter entitled "Moral and Psychological Backup" has been brought in, along with clarifications connected with certain aspects of provision. The place and role of new Ground Force formations—motorized rifle and tank brigades—in combined-arms combat have been defined. Normative indicators have been set for them. Moreover, it has been decided to rework formal documents containing regulations in 1994-1995—something that a special commission is currently at work on.

As for the features of training different categories of servicemen, here we proceed on the basis of a single ultimate goal—the readiness of subunits to fulfill their combat mission in all types of combat irrespective of the manpower acquisition principle used. Individual training has been introduced for those serving under contract. One or two days a month are given over to it. It is worth noting that the planning for individual training also takes account of the level of subunits' training, questions on which further work should be done, and...requests from the contract servicemen themselves. Individual training exercises mainly employ drills, group exercises, and practical work.

As to women.... There is nothing special about their training. They train according to their speciality within a subunit or training group. In other words, however heterogeneous the military may be, the aim of training remains unchanged—to teach people what they need in warfare.

Comparative Description of Intensity of Exercises Staged Under NATO Joint Armed Forces Plans in 1989-1993

Venue	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Northern European Theater	56	41	35	31	20
Central European Theater	58	70	58	46	38
Southern European Theater	52	47	35	42	42
Total in European Theater	166	158	128	119	100

Comparative Cost of Tactical Exercises (in Thousands of Rubles)

Description of Exercise	1991
Battalion-level tactical exercise involving a motorized-rifle battalion and a tank company (live-fire)	134.3
Regimental tactical exercise involving a tank division tank regiment (live-fire)	1,231
Divisional tactical exercise involving a motorized-rifle division (live fire by motorized-rifle and tank regiments)	5,926

Note: In subsequent years the cost of the exercises rises in line with the price increases for fuel, lubricants, and ammunition.

AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES**Level of Air Force Flight Operations Noted**

944D0010A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
21 Apr 94 p 1

[News item by Sergey Babichev of the Air Force press center: "A 'Cloudless Sky' Over the Fliers of Russia"]

[Text] Russian Federation Minister of Defense General of the Army Pavel Grachev made note of the high proficiency of the Air Forces at a conference of the command personnel of the Armed Forces.

The aircraft of the Air Forces went up 13,202 times in the last week of April alone. The total flying time was 6,932 hours. Some 2,092 personnel were transported to remote garrisons and groups of forces from 11 through 17 April. Military-transport aviation also provided transportation for 1,682 people and 993 tonnes of cargo from 8 through 14 April. Air Forces aircraft also made 37 international flights for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.

NAVAL FORCES**The Russian Navy's Structural Development Problems**

94UM0423A Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK in Russian
No 4, Apr 1994 pp 3-6

[Article by Candidate of Naval Sciences, Retired Admiral Nikolay Nikolayevich Amelko, under the rubric: "Time and the Navy": "The Russian Navy's Structural Development Problems"]

[Text] Concern with regard to the current state of the Russian Navy and its future, especially on the threshold of the 300th anniversary of the native navy, prompts many

people to express, through the mass media, their points of view on the resolution of the problems of its preservation and development.

We offer for your attention the opinion of Retired Admiral N.N. Amelko on a series of aspects of this problem. Admiral Amelko commanded the Pacific Fleet from 1962-1969, was Navy deputy commander-in-chief from 1969-1978, and was deputy chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces for the Navy from 1978-1988. It is possible that not all of the conclusions and suggestions of the author of this article are indisputable but Nikolay Nikolayevich's sincere interest in preserving a strong Russian Navy and also his many years of service experience make the position he is defending worthy of special attention.

At the present time, the issues of the development of the Russian Navy are acquiring greater urgency and the attention that our professional magazine is paying to them is not surprising. Other magazines, newspapers and television are also broaching this topic, although not always thoroughly and frequently in the well-known combination of "the Army and Navy".

To my great regret, even in such an important government document as the presentation of "Osnovnyye polozheniya voyennoy doktriny Rossiyskoy Federatsii" [The Main Provisions of Russian Federation Military Doctrine], one small paragraph is devoted to the Navy which prescribes: "Step up the dialog on the preparation and adoption of effective international agreements in the sphere of the reduction of naval forces and weapons and the limitation of naval activity".¹ And that is everything that concerns the Navy.

Admittedly, this is only a presentation of the doctrine and maybe there is something in the full text about our Navy's role, place, and missions in the defense and protection of Russia's interests, otherwise we can understand that paragraph as the intention to eliminate the Navy in general as a service of the Armed Forces. Moreover, the impression is being created that the Government and the president have no advisors on the Navy's problems and they are not being seriously dealt with. We know that the president had an advisor on military issues—former Deputy Chief of the

Main Political Directorate for Ideology, Colonel-General D.A. Volkogonov—whose competence in the operational-strategic issues of the employment of the Armed Forces and, all the more so their component—the Navy—is very doubtful.

Currently, many of the country's leaders, including the minister of defense, visit our fleets but we haven't heard or read about the results of their visits, assessments of the state and current activities of naval forces, perhaps with the exception of the establishment of the serious housing situation for seamen and especially statements on the prospects for their development. In this context, we cannot pass over in silence the presentation of this magazine correspondent's interview with First Deputy Minister of Defense Andrey Afanasyevich Kokoshin that appeared in *MORSKOY SBORNIK* No 11, 1993, which was titled "Rossii nuzhen dostoinnyy ee flot" [Russia Needs a Proper Navy]. A number of the thoughts expressed in the responses to the correspondent were perceived with great surprise by myself as a veteran who devoted 57 years to service in the Navy and as a participant of two wars, yes and by many of my colleagues. Obviously, we need to perceive what A.A. Kokoshin said as the views of the Ministry of Defense leadership on our Navy's present and future.

In my opinion, the main thing in the interview was the presentation of the missions that the Navy must be ready to accomplish for the purpose of Russia's security and defense. It appears to us that the missions were correctly set forth and, indeed, we would like for them to have been worded not in such general terms but in more specific terms.

However, there is something contained in A.A. Kokoshin's responses that puts us on guard. I was especially concerned by A.A. Kokoshin's statement: "I would not say that we have a new shipbuilding program in its traditional sense. I think that there must be a weapons development program on the whole where the Navy will be a component". It's obvious that the understanding of this component was engendered by an underestimation of the Navy's role in the system of defense and protection of Russia's interests under contemporary conditions, its complexity and essence. This is confirmed by other statements: "... Due to our geostrategic position, we traditionally are more a land than a naval power, yes and Russia's military fate, as a rule, has been decided on land". The reason why adequate attention is not being devoted to the Navy in the current military doctrine is certainly contained in these two quotes.

I don't know if it is worth repeating that Russia's maritime border is approximately 40,000 kilometers which is more than two times its land border and more than the coast line of all of Europe and we also need to protect and, when necessary, defend this border. Or recall the rapidly increasing significance of the continental shelf, maritime economic zones, etc., the protection of which is becoming a very important mission just like ensuring safety of navigation and fishing. Consequently, the statement that Russia is more a land than a naval power is not only groundless but also contains a distortion of Russia's geostrategic position and a disparagement of our Navy's role.

We can agree with the fact that Russia's military fate, as a rule, has been decided on land. But we must not forget that in all wars the Navy was not only the Army's loyal assistant but also an active participant of many joint, with ground troops and aviation, battles for the sake of victory. To disparage the Navy's role and significance—means to cancel out its 300-year history and to forget its achievements under the leadership of Peter I, Spiridov, Ushakov, Senyavin, Lazarev, Nakhimov, Essen, Kuznetsov, and to forget its innovators and the discoverers of new lands. We must also remember that during the Great Patriotic War the Navy conducted 105 different amphibious assault landings and that all enemy-occupied ports and coastal cities were seized by the enemy not from the sea but from land. Recall the Navy's role in defending and lifting the blockade of Leningrad, and the defense of Odessa, Sevastopol and Zapolarye. The Northern Fleet's provision of escorts for allied convoys. The fact that our ships, submarines, naval aviation, and coastal artillery destroyed 1,245 combatants and auxiliary ships and 1,307 transport ships of Fascist Germany and its allies during the war. The enemy's irretrievable losses on them totaled thousands of seamen, soldiers and officers, hundreds of thousands of weapons and tonnes of strategic cargoes.

Despite the warming of relations between the former irreconcilable enemies on the whole, all kinds of military conflicts have not subsided in the world in the contemporary international situation. NATO is maintaining and expanding its activity as a military organization which is even replacing the UN Security Council's Military Committee and is attempting to resolve emerging conflict situations using arms and sometimes even outside the bloc's zone and without taking into account the opinions of the members of the UN Security Council itself. Therefore, it is extremely rash to assert that there is no threat—if not of war, than of the emergence of armed conflicts into which Russia and the other CIS countries could be drawn.

At the same time, the experience of all of the latest most serious conflicts points toward an increase of the significance of the operations of aviation and naval forces in them which attests to the increase of the danger precisely from the maritime axes. In an article published in *NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA* on 8 February 1994, the author criticizes our military doctrine because it does not indicate a specific enemy against whom we are creating the armed forces. But do we need to repeat previous errors? In my view, we must not seek specific enemies but build the armed forces from the calculation that they could appear from any direction. And because we must put a stop to any infringement on the sovereignty and integrity of Russia and the CIS countries, we must be ready to accomplish that mission because it is simply impossible to restructure anything, especially the Navy, in a short period of time.

Proceeding from what has been stated above, in my opinion, it is advisable to word our Navy's missions as follows:

1. Ensuring the security of Russia and the CIS countries from the naval axes. In my view, we must consider the primary danger to be strikes by sea-launched long-range cruise missiles, the platforms of which are surface combatants and submarines. Today, this is the Tomahawk sea-launched long-range cruise missile with a

launch range of approximately 3,000 kilometers. This permits them to destroy targets located on the European territory of Russia to the Urals, all targets in Belorussia [Belarus], Ukraine, Moldova, North Caucasus, and Central Asia during launches from the Barents, Norwegian and Mediterranean seas, from the North Atlantic and even from the Indian Ocean. From the areas of the Sea of Japan, Sea of Okhotsk, and the Pacific Ocean—all targets of Russia to the Irkutsk meridian. Carrier-based and strategic aviation are another danger from the maritime axes. We can compare the destruction radius of carrier-based aircraft, especially with the utilization of airfields of contiguous states upon their return with the launch range of sea-launched long-range cruise missiles and even strategic aviation.

The most effective weapon to repel sea-launched long-range cruise missile and carrier-based aviation strikes—is to bring pressure to bear against their platforms and only an effective Navy, that has been deployed during the threatened period in the detected areas of their combat maneuvering, is capable of combating them.

2. Constant maintenance of naval strategic nuclear forces at a high degree of readiness. Considering their very important function of deterring aggression, paramount attention must be devoted to ensuring their high combat readiness, the reliability of command and control and disseminating combat command and control signals, and also the defense of basing and dispersal areas and patrol areas because they become the "number 1" targets of destruction with the initiation of combat operations.
3. Defense of external and internal maritime lines of communications and other economic and scientific activity in remote areas of the seas and oceans. Here lately, isn't it strange, the struggle with piracy on the high seas is once again becoming urgent and, according to data of the London Center for Combating Piracy, in the first half of 1993 alone, of the 83 attacks against civilian ships that were taken into account, 24 attacks were against Russian ships.
4. Participation of some of our fleet forces in peace-keeping actions based upon UN Security Council decisions to put a stop to armed conflicts.

All of the indicated missions for the defense of Russian and the CIS states from the maritime axes are timely even today. Their accomplishment requires daily readiness and aggressive activity from our fleets because only they are capable of accomplishing them with the required effectiveness. And to do that we need a "proper" navy and not only in support of Russia but also in support of all of the Commonwealth of Independent States. It seems to me that today the need for the creation of Unified Naval Forces in support of the CIS, with shared participation in this matter of all Commonwealth countries, is already quite obvious because practically all of them separately are incapable of creating modern, even if small, national naval forces or of maintaining them. Incidentally, I did not make a slip of the tongue when I employed the term "Yedinyye Voyenno-Morskiye Sily SNG" [CIS Unified Naval Forces]. All the same a navy is only ships, submarines and support ships.

However, today besides that, it also has at its disposal naval aviation, coastal missile and artillery units, naval infantry and coastal defense units, and also arsenals, ship repair plants and shops, engineer units and rear services organs. Therefore, currently the Navy, besides the weapons that are purely specific for it, has at its disposal practically all of the weapons that the other services of the Armed Forces have which makes its Naval Forces designation more correct.

I am in total agreement with A.A. Kokoshin that we don't need "traditional shipbuilding programs" in that sense and with those approaches as we previously understood them. We should have long ago oriented ourselves on the development of integrated combat systems that organically combine ships of various classes, their weapons and support systems which, incidentally, Navy specialists have dreamed of for years. Then we would not have that large collection of ship and submarine designs, types of weapons for them and other similar shortcomings. But along with that, while considering the technical complexity of the structure of the Navy, we need not a separate component of common weapons but an independent "Naval Forces Development Program" that meets the new conditions. In the process, specialists—naval professionals—must be involved with its development, the Russian Government must approve it and the CIS Heads of State Council must approve it for the Unified Naval Forces.

During the course of this work, each design for a ship, weapons system or support system must be based upon its need, compatibility and, of course, "cost-effectiveness" criteria. But to prevent a return to the customary past, the approval of decisions on these issues must occur at the Governmental level based on the conclusions of an independent committee of experts. We must enlist the appropriate naval experts, practitioners at the level of commanders of fleets and flotillas, both active commanders and those who held these posts in the past, and also scientists, designers, manufacturers and other experts in the work of the committee of experts, only they must mandatorily be independent of those departments which have vested interests in obtaining more expensive, and therefore profitable, orders that do not always satisfy the Navy as this frequently occurred in the past. A small team of consultants on naval affairs could be formed from them, the absence of which is already being felt. Its functions must include the organization of that independent committee of experts and preparation of findings and the appropriate governmental decrees based upon it...

As for ships, submarines, and naval weapons, here obviously the reduction of their noise level and weight and dimensions specifications of all systems, the development of missile ships on new maintenance principles merit the most rapt attention. We already had these designs and experimental models but some of them were discarded as unprofitable for the Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry. The development of a low-noise nuclear multi-mission [mnogotselevaya] submarine (it is precisely a multi-mission submarine) is required in order to rid ourselves of multiple types of ships when a separate design was developed and built for each mission and their number reached two dozen in the fleets. There is also a similar situation with surface combatants. A ship with a displacement of

5,000-10,000 tonnes must be both missile, antisubmarine warfare, convoy and escort. Multiple types of ships dramatically increase expenditures both during construction and during operation. The military-industrial complex, and especially the Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry, were interested in a large number of increasingly new designs because they received colossal bonuses and thousands of awards for each of them and the highest leaders of departments even received the rank of Heroes of the Soviet Union or Heroes of Socialist Labor.

A.A. Kokoshin correctly states that, while considering our state's serious economic situation, we need to rationally spend even minimally allocated resources. Unfortunately, we still haven't rid ourselves of mismanagement and we even encounter outright thievery. He correctly tasks our fleets with the mission for the next 2-3 years—this is a struggle for survival. We understand that today there is no possibility to allocate appropriations for the Navy based upon the actual need. But at the same time, the Navy must not be doomed to "self-survival" in order for it to survive. Preservation Of the Navy is a task not only for the Navy or the Ministry of Defense themselves but also for both the Government and the president.

Footnotes

1. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 19 November 1993.

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Developing Naval Command and Control Theory

94UM0424A Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK in Russian No 4, Apr 1994 pp 37-40

[Article by Naval Main Staff First Deputy Chief, Vice Admiral Yu. Kaysin, under the rubric: "Questions of Theory": "Developing Naval Command and Control Theory"]

[Text] The Navy's combat readiness is formed in peacetime and its improvement is a continuous process. In the process, the underestimation of just one of the elements of combat readiness can result in such consequences that are at times impossible to correct during the course of a war. Proceeding from that, the Navy's leadership is making heightened requirements to the activities of commanding generals, commanders and staffs in this sphere.

The capability of command and control organs to bring themselves and subordinate units to readiness to accomplish combat missions in a timely manner and also the skill of commanding generals, commanders and staffs to firmly command and control subordinate forces during the course of preparing for and conducting military operations is one of the primary elements of naval forces combat readiness. Military history knows quite a few examples when units or formations, that had a powerful combat potential, lost battles and engagements to an enemy who was equal in forces and sometimes weaker precisely due to the absence of operational, continuous and reliable command and control.

Our Navy's operations on 22 June 1941 serve as a positive example. Having manifested vigilance and based upon information obtained on the change of the operational situation at sea and in the air, the Navy's command

authorities issued the order to shift fleet forces to full combat readiness several hours prior to the enemy attack which permitted them to successfully repel a surprise attack. As a result, on the first day of the war, our Navy did not lose a single ship or aircraft.

The experience of the latest local wars and armed conflicts also objectively confirms the need to prepare the command and control system for the complex conditions of entry into war. So, according to foreign press information, during the course of Israeli Armed Forces aggression into Lebanon (in 1982), the Israelis managed to reveal the Syrian troop formations' command and control and communications system which permitted them to conduct accurate strikes against the revealed targets already at the beginning of the conflict. As a result, they managed to completely or partially disrupt command and control of Syrian troops, their aviation and air defense systems.

In the Persian Gulf, during the first two weeks of combat operations of the United States and its allies against the Iraqi Armed Forces, approximately 25 percent of the command and control organs were destroyed and 50 percent were rendered inoperable which permitted them to practically paralyze the Iraqi Armed Forces command and control system and to dramatically reduce coalition forces losses. It is characteristic that one of the reasons that caused the defeat of the Argentine Armed Forces in the Falklands (Malvinas) Islands (1981) were the shortcomings of their command and control system that reduced the reliability and stability of the leadership of combat operations.

All of this attests to the need to maintain the command and control system at a high degree of combat readiness during peacetime and to ensure its transition beforehand to combat readiness when a threat emerges and also its role in the attainment of victory in wartime.

Definition of Command and Control Theory

The content of military practice has perceptibly expanded under contemporary conditions. The significance of military theory has also correspondingly increased. Therefore, the role of military scientific research and also the significance of the timeliness of the introduction of their results into the practice of military structural development have substantially increased. We know that theory sheds light on the path of practice and practice is the driving force and the goal of the development of theory.

Naval theory—this is the system of scientific knowledge that reveals the laws and patterns of armed combat at sea, the principles of structural development of the Navy, its preparation and employment in the system of the armed forces both during the course of a war and also during peacetime. While defining the prospects and directions of naval development on a scientific basis, it is a part of military science and is in subordinate dependence to it. In turn, naval command and control theory permeates all of the elements of naval theory.

In the Soviet Military Encyclopedia, the concept of ground (naval) forces command and control is interpreted as the activity of commanding generals (commanders, superiors), staffs, services and other command and control organs for the maintenance of the combat readiness and combat

capability of ground (naval) forces, preparation of operations and combat operations and their leadership while accomplishing the assigned missions. At the same time, it indicates that in a broader sense troop command and control encompasses all of the activity of strategic leadership, commanding generals (commanders, superiors), and staffs both for command and control in a combat situation and also for the development and combat improvement of ground (naval) forces, the organization of operational and combat training and service of the troops, maintenance of discipline and high moral spirit of personnel, and ensuring continuous combat and mobilization readiness of the troops (naval forces).

However, in our view, we must examine command and control theory as one of the components of military science that has an independent sphere of research that is based upon the common laws and principles of command and control of the Armed Forces. In the process, the provisions of naval command and control theory certainly must take into account and reflect the specific features of the Navy while resolving the missions of armed combat at sea and in turn be part of all of the components of naval theory. So, its own private theory, that takes into account the specific nature of this activity, is being developed based upon the general provisions of command and control theory.

From what has been stated above, we can arrive at the conclusion that contemporary naval forces command and control theory must be developed as naval command and control theory on the whole. Let's dwell on this in more detail.

In our view, the activity of the command authorities and command and control organs during preparation of the Navy for the armed defense of the state and the employment of forces during the course of military operations, that are being conducted both independently and also jointly with other services of the Armed Forces, is the object of study of this theory. Its subject are the laws, patterns, principles and categories of command and control, the organized forms and methods of functioning of the naval command and control system under various conditions and while accomplishing various missions with the employment of contemporary technical command and control systems.

The structure of naval command and control theory must examine all of the specific features of the peculiarities of command and control of forces while preparing for and conducting operations and combat operations, the management of construction, operational, combat, moral-psychological training and education of personnel, and also scientific research and other types of naval activity. In our view, it consists of the following elements: the foundations of naval command and control, command and control organs, systems and equipment, and organization and methods of command and control. The laws and principles of the science of command and control of the state and the Armed Forces, that are being employed while taking into account the specific nature of the missions, organization, and forms of utilization of naval forces, are its methodological basis, like all other sciences. Furthermore, it broadly utilizes the information of the natural and

technical sciences, based upon which the continuous improvement of command and control methods and systems is being carried out.

Development of Naval Forces Command and Control Theory

The art of command and control of naval forces had already emerged in ancient times. We know that in the 5th Century B.C. ships in the Greek Navy had already been formed into detachments for convenience of command and control in battle and the naval commander had several assistants which we can consider to be the beginning of the birth of the organization of command and control of forces. It was improved over the course of many centuries along with the development of naval forces and naval battle tactics. The first naval charter of 1720, in which the combat experience of ship operations in the Northern War was summarized, played a large role in the establishment in our country of the theory and practice of command and control of naval forces. The appearance of a steam-powered navy required the development of both new tactics and also the organization of the command and control of its forces. Headquarters of formations were created in the Russian Navy in the 1880's as a result of the increase of the volume of command and control functions.

The introduction of the radio became revolutionary in the matter of the command and control of naval forces. So, the experience of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 pointed out that command and control had attained the significance of an important factor that determines the attainment of victory in armed combat at sea and its excessive centralization and Vice Admiral Rozhdestvenskiy's underestimation of the capabilities of command and control using radio were noted among the causes of the defeat of the 2nd Pacific Squadron in the Battle of Tsushima. Furthermore, the absence of a full-fledged staff under the commanding general had a negative impact on the quality of command and control of forces during this battle.

After the Russo-Japanese War, the question on the reorganization of the naval leadership staff was urgently raised. In 1906, the Naval General Staff was created with the functions of operational-strategic leadership of the Navy because the Main Naval Staff that had existed prior to this was involved only with administrative-management activities.

During the course of the First World War, objective conditions for the emergence of a new form of combat activity of the fleet—the naval operation—developed as a result of the appearance of new branches of forces (submarines and aviation) and the increased scale of combat operations at sea. Its introduction into the practice of armed combat at sea began to be implemented thanks to the increased capabilities of fleet and staff commanding generals for command and control of forces at great distances using radio communications and also for planning large-scale operations with the involvement of operational staff organs.

The expansion of the missions, the qualitative and quantitative composition of the Navy, the forms of its combat employment, and the introduction of new technical systems rendered a substantial influence on the development

of naval forces command and control techniques. Having absorbed the accumulated domestic and foreign experience of command and control of forces in the First World War and the Civil War, the theory and practice of command and control of forces found its expression in an entire series of interim guidance and instructions and, in 1925, in the first postwar general military regulation.

Furthermore, the military reform of 1924-1925, having affected all spheres of activity of the Armed Forces, resulted in the reorganization of the central staff. One-man command was introduced and special research was conducted to improve command and control of forces at all levels. In 1937, the People's Commissariat of the Navy was formed for the direct leadership of fleet forces. On the eve of the Great Patriotic War, it introduced a number of documents that regulated the combat activities of the fleets and contained requirements and recommendations for planning and organizing combat operations and the leadership of their conduct. The war years were an important stage in the improvement and development of the naval forces command and control system and principles. The provisions of command and control theory underwent combat verification. Much attention was devoted to summarizing and disseminating combat experience in those years. In the process, the new dimensions of the nature of fleet operations during the course of the Second World War had an impact on the development of the theory and practice of command and control of forces, the most important of which were:

the spatial scale that encompassed enormous spheres of the seas and oceans with active combat;

the increase of the role of the most universal branches of fleet forces—submarines and aviation (especially, carrier-based aviation) in armed combat;

the increase of the significance in attaining the common goal of joint operations of the Army and Navy, their coordination in defensive and offensive operations (which found its expression, in particular, in the increase of the number of amphibious assault landings), during which the fleets were operationally subordinated to the troop coastal combined formations or the creation of a single command authority was stipulated, joint development of combat documents was conducted by staffs, command and control was organized from a single or closely-located command posts, the exchange of staffs by operational groups, etc.; and,

the increase of the number of major naval operations and engagements, especially with the participation of carrier-based strike formations.

During the course of the Great Patriotic and Second World wars, the staffs of various echelons and other command and control organs, radio communications and situation coverage systems received significant development. The experience of these wars and the new trends of development of the theory and practice of command and control of naval forces lay at the foundation of the resolution of the problems of the leadership of the activities of the fleets right up to the end of the 1950's. During subsequent years, the leading naval powers, including our country, developed qualitatively new ocean navies based upon the achievements of science and the military-technical

revolution and modern and fundamentally new command and control systems were deployed to realize the combat potential of these ocean navies.

Naval Forces Command and Control Theory at the Current Stage

The history of navies, like military history on the whole, does not provide and cannot provide prepared recipes for the resolution of today's problems. Its main value is in the capability to reveal the general patterns of development and to provide a scientific analysis of the phenomena of past wars and to extract object lessons from them.

Under contemporary conditions, various types of automated command and control systems, using special software, are being widely utilized for the collection, analysis and transmission of information. This permits them to shift to the automation of the most important process of command and control—working out a decision. If a decision is the meaty basis of command and control, the command and control system, the main elements of which are command and control organs and facilities, communications and automated command and control systems, and also the system for extracting and gathering information on the situation, serves as its material basis at the present time.

Automation of the command and control of forces is normally understood to be the process of developing and realizing the required system of technical equipment that permit accomplishing certain command and control functions automatically, without the participation of man in command and control organs (staffs and command posts). Actually, at the present time it does not appear to be possible to effectively control many spheres of activity, including naval forces, without utilizing automated command and control systems. But nevertheless man still remains the main figure in the command and control process. Really command and control is first and foremost anticipation. Machines can only ease and accelerate the process but are presently incapable of replacing the creativity of the intellect.

The decision made by the commanding general (commander) is the basis of command and control of forces. Command and control is structured on its basis and must ensure effective utilization of the combat capabilities of forces and successful accomplishment of missions by them within the prescribed time periods under any conditions of the situation. Therefore, unswerving observance of the principle—teach staffs and naval forces what is required in war—as before is the main requirement made toward the activities of commanding generals, commanders, staffs and command and control organs during the planning, organization and conduct of operational and combat training measures.

The existing structure of the naval forces command and control system, which was developed in peacetime and includes the command and control organs and facilities, communications and situation coverage systems, and also automated command and control systems, permits us to accomplish the important functions of supporting the conduct of combat operations. It's obvious that, on the one hand, under all conditions the system must ensure stable,

uninterrupted, operational and concealed command and control of its own forces and, on the other hand, provide the capability to carry out disruption of the enemy forces and weapons command and control systems by employing men and equipment to disable enemy command and control facilities, communications hubs, navigation systems, etc. or to achieve disruptions in their operation.

However, it is not simple to accomplish all of these missions. At the present time, there is an objective need to increase the quality of all training of command and control facilities because its shortcomings reduce the quality of the assessment of the situation which, in turn, does not promote the correct prediction of its development. In the process, this can result not because people are unskilled but because the existing direction of their training and also the level of organization of coordination of command and control facilities combat crews does not always promote success in operations in a specific situation.

While considering what has been stated above, steps have already been taken in the fleets to increase the quality of training for the command and control of forces but there still remains a significant sphere for initiative. In the process, in our view, first of all we need a scientific approach to the problem of improving the combat training of command and control facilities, the goal of which must become increasing the combat readiness level of the entire command and control system and its capability to withstand any unpleasant situations under the most varied conditions. Here, in our opinion, along with the resolution of a number of technical problems, we need to increase the quality of individual training of officers of command and control facilities, to precisely ascertain the list of methodological and guiding documents that regulate training for command and control of forces and the performance of operational alert duty and also the selection of the most optimal organizational forms of training utilizing computer systems.

Developed at the end of the 1980's, the naval forces command and control system corresponded to the composition, structure and missions being accomplished and on the whole supported command and control of naval forces and also combat and operational training of forces and staffs. In the process, the primary provisions of the new military doctrine on the whole did not affect the principles of its formation. Analysis of the operational training inspections and measures that were conducted in the 1993 training year indicated that, despite a number of deficiencies that were revealed, the Navy's command and control organs are capable of accomplishing the assigned missions. However, the change of the state borders partially affected the effectiveness of the Navy's command and control system. At the present time, the command and control organs themselves have also been subjected to a substantial reorganization and experience shows that a drastic reduction and change of the structures of command and control organs has always been reflected in the qualitative indicators of their functioning. We must also take into account the fact that the entire load of work not only for the command and control of forces but also for the reorganization lies on the command and control organs.

Moreover, at the present time we can precisely see the naval powers' navies' increasing role in maintaining peace

and stability, accomplishing peacekeeping functions, conducting foreign policy actions under the aegis of the United Nations, rendering assistance to the population in emergency situations, etc. This, in turn, entails the need for a comprehensive analysis and rethinking of a number of directions in the training of command and control organs. With the increased probability of the outbreak of regional conflicts, in this training we need officers to expand their study of the political, economic, and social processes that are occurring in these regions.

Here we have touched upon only the most general issues that are associated with the development of naval forces command and control theory. We would like for the chiefs of staff of all levels to participate in the development of its individual issues and to share the experience that has been accumulated in the process on the pages of the press. This will certainly promote the strengthening of the Navy's combat readiness.

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Decline of Research Fleet

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17 May 94 p 2

[Article by Valeriy Gromak under "The State: Words and Deeds" rubric: "For Sale After Being Under Arrest?: the Russian Oceanographic Fleet May Lose a Unique Research Ship"]

[Text] After fortunately escaping seizure in the port of Las Palmas (Canary Islands), the research ship "Akademik Sergey Vavilov" returned to its home shores. But in Port Stanley (Falkland Islands), another research ship, the "Akademik Ioffe," which also belongs to the Institute of Oceanography imeni P.P. Shirshov of the Russian Academy of Sciences, has been under arrest since 17 March as a hostage for the "Vavilov" that "slipped away." However, the story of the seizure of one ship and the "escape" of another began long before the unpleasant outcome for the Russian side and it is not yet over.

Just a few years ago research ships of this class performed an enormous amount of work in the study of the world oceans, including in the interests of the Russian Navy. For example, it was only because of the unique equipment and efforts of the command of the research ship "Akademik Mstislav Keldysh" that it was possible to clarify the situation with respect to the nuclear submarine "Komsomolets" lying on the bottom of the sea. For well-known reasons, however, today it is practically impossible to maintain the unique fleet and to carry out research through the means of the state budget only. Last year, therefore, the Institute of Oceanography of the Russian Academy of Sciences leased the research ship "Akademik Sergey Vavilov" to the Russian-German joint enterprise "Polar Shipping" out of St. Petersburg for a period of five years for tourist cruises. Under the contract, the charterer had the right to make tourist cruises and to obtain an income from this activity under that condition that the charterer will assume all of the expenditures for the maintenance of the ship, including material-technical supply, the cost of fuel,

the payment of the crew, and registered repairs. As payment for the five-year lease, the company "Polar Shipping" obligated itself to pay the expenditures of two scientific expeditions on this ship for 100 days each and costing \$400,000.

But after just six months of operations, the company refused to finance the first expedition. Moreover, in the period from the 8th through the 15th of November of last year in the port of Bremerhaven (Germany), a German firm carried out a repair of the research ship "Akademik Sergey Vavilov" for the sum of 338,800 German marks [DM]. The company "Polar Shipping" assigned an intermediary firm to perform work in connection with the repairs, but when it came time to settle accounts there was no one to pay. On 15 December of last year, the Institute of Oceanography canceled the contract with the joint enterprise "Polar Shipping." Not having contract relations with the representative of the German intermediary firm, the institute naturally could not control his actions and the institute did not sanction the servicing of the ship on credit.

Meanwhile, the German creditor companies, despairing of the prospects of somehow getting back the funds invested in the repairs, turned to the supreme court of the Falkland Islands, in whose district the research ship "Akademik Sergey Vavilov" was operating in those days, to demand the money from the ship owner, the Institute of Oceanography. In those same latitudes, another ship of the institute, the "Akademik Ioffe," made a cruise with paid passengers on board under contract with a Canadian tourism company. The captain of the "Vavilov" was warned of the threat of seizure, and, landing his passengers in one of the ports of Argentina, did not go to the Falklands. The completely unsuspecting crew of the "Akademik Ioffe" stopped there in Port Stanley. It is now well known how that ended for them. The ship was seized. It is still unclear what will happen next. In Russia, they prefer not to talk about the incident, and in Germany, judging by published articles, they are formulating prospects that are by no means pleasant for us. In the article "Double Freight," for example, one German newspaper writes: "The scientific research ships "Akademik Sergey Vavilov" and "Akademik Ioffe" were built in Finland in 1988 and their cost exceeded \$30 million. Today it cannot be ruled out," the newspaper stresses, "that the indebtedness of the German company will lead to the sale of the ship "Akademik Ioffe "at auction."

I tried to find out from Igor Mikhaltsev, doctor of physical and mathematical sciences and the head of one of the laboratories of the Institute of Oceanography, what they think about this in Russia. By directive of the president of the Academy of Sciences of the Russian Federation, Igor Yevgenyevich was appointed chairman of a special commission to investigate this entire story. But through intermediaries I. Mikhaltsev refused to meet with the correspondent prior to the conclusion of the trial and the final end of this whole story.

As of today, the captain of the "Akademik Ioffe" has sent an official protest to the governor of the Falkland Islands. A letter about defense was sent through an English legal firm that undertook to represent the interests of the

Oceanographic Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences in the ship. At the same time, the institute appealed to a maritime arbitration commission in Moscow with an action against the company "Polar Shipping" to prevent the sale of the ship at auction. To "free" the ship, it is necessary to make a deposit to the Supreme Court of the Falkland Islands or to provide a guarantee from a first-class Western bank and then to proceed with the trial in accordance with the procedures of the English court. The amount of the deposit is considerable—about DM400,000 for the claim of the shipyard, \$50,000 for legal services, and \$25,000 to pay for the forced stay in the port. Depending upon the course of the review of the case in the Supreme Court of the Falkland Islands, there may be additional claims of other German firms for a total of DM1,125,985.29. It will then be necessary to make a deposit for these claims as well.

Of course the ship owners have no idea where they can seek such funds. But something else is clear. Russian science, which has made a truly titanic contribution to the investigation of the world oceans, must not lose its authority and the authority of a power by degrading itself to the point of transporting tourists on unique ships. For this reason, the return of the seized ship is a matter of the honor of Russia and it is in its interests not to diminish the dignity of domestic scientists through the temptation of irresponsible business even on behalf of the noble goals of scientific research.

REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

Strategic Studies Center's Tasks Outlined

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[Interview with Yevgeniy Kozhokin, director of the Russian Strategic Studies Institute, by Vladimir Khrustov under the "Decision-making Mechanism" rubric; date, place not given: "Information for Reflection Being Prepared for Top State Leaders Adopting Political Decisions by Experts at the Russian Strategic Studies Institute"—first three paragraphs are introduction; last three paragraphs are ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI note]

[Text] It is believed that information is the most expensive commodity in the modern world. Indeed, without having accurate, objective, unbiased, and obviously timely information at your disposal, it is hard to make a correct decision.

The demands for information rise considerably and its role increases many times over if it is intended for top state leaders adopting political decisions. In this case, however, it is not just "pure information" that is needed, but also information that is analyzed beforehand by specialists and is presented in the form of analytical reports with brief conclusions and even recommendations.

The Russian Strategic Studies Institute [RSSI], formed by an edict of the Russian Federation president, is one of information and analysis centers working for the country's top organs of power and administration. "What is the priority in your activity, and who receives your materials?"—a conversation between your ROSSIYSKIYE

VESTI correspondent and RSSI Director Yevgeniy Kozhokin, began with this question.

[Kozhokin] The institute's specialization is the problem of Russia's national security in all its multifaceted aspects. Hence the main range of consumers of our output: The President's staff, the government apparatus, the relevant Federation Council and State Duma committees, the Security Council, the CIS Joint Armed Forces staff, and a number of ministries and departments—defense, internal affairs, the security service, the Russian Federation State Committee for the Defense Sectors of Industry, and others.

[Khrustov] What are the main avenues of the RSSI's scientific research?

[Kozhokin] Targeted comprehensive programs form their basis. I will briefly outline the basic ones.

The first one is Russia's national security. A number of studies have been carried out within the framework of this program to determine approaches toward a concept of national security and the structuring of this problem. Methods of recognizing and predicting threats to Russia's security are being elaborated, and proposals for elaborating the strategy of the country's national security are being prepared, taking into consideration its new role and position in Europe and the Asia-Pacific Region, and indeed the whole world.

The second one concerns the so-called nearby foreign countries. The main point here is revealing factors of strategic risk on Russia's borders, which have emerged following the collapse of the USSR and the formation of the new independent states: interethnic conflicts, territorial claims and disputes, the creation of national armies and the quest for an autonomous military policy, and the aspiration of individual states to economic autarky.

The third is European security. This avenue of the institute's activity specifically embraces problems that are strategically important to Russia, such as prospects of European political and economic integration, new developments in NATO policy, in particular the "Partnership for Peace" program, the West European Union, and the CSCE.

The fourth program is connected with ensuring Russia's economic priorities. The institute is comprehensively identifying the most important factors in the economic sphere. Conceptual proposals for protecting Russia's vital interests in the sphere of currency and credit, energy, and food security are being elaborated. The latest trends in the development of the world economy, which are influencing economic reform in the Russian Federation, are being studied. Problems and prospects of our country's participation in authoritative international economic organizations are being examined.

Another important avenue of activity is military policy and conversion. The purpose of this study program is to analyze and elaborate proposals for Russia's top organs of state power in the sphere of military doctrine and organizational development, the conversion of the defense industry, the commercialization of space, the arms trade, and military-technical cooperation with foreign countries, taking world experience and the latest trends in international markets into account.

We consider participation in the elaboration and implementation of comprehensive conversion programs to be an independent sphere in the activity of the RSSI. This involves the coordination of efforts in formulate legislative initiatives in the sphere of conversion; information and analysis backup for conversion projects on the basis of developing data banks on the state of markets for conversion output and on domestic and foreign enterprises which are potential partners in the implementation of conversion programs; and the conducting of independent experts' appraisals and competitions for conversion projects.

And finally, the last program, the sixth, concerns the environment. A study of the environmental policy of foreign countries is being conducted within the framework of this program, the development of state-of-the-art environmentally clean technologies is being examined, and proposals are being elaborated to amend Russian legislation in the sphere of the protection of the environment, in particular in connection with military activity, and so on.

[Khrustov] What is the institute's output proper, and in what form do the consumers receive it?

[Kozhokin] It is primarily information and analysis material in the form of reviews, information, and memorandum. In order to work out appraisals that are as objective and balanced as possible, the RSSI makes fairly active use of seminars, exchanges of opinion, and situation analyses, which are regularly conducted with the participation of experts in the interests of a number of Russian Federation ministries and departments, the Security Council, and also parliamentary committees.

For example, the institute has already produced around 20 situation analyses on the problems of Russia's relations with the new independent states in nearby foreign parts, the economic situation in the country, treaties on the reduction of strategic offensive weapons, the role of the United Nations in the modern world, the conversion of defense production, and other questions.

Of the major subjects which are "in progress," I would single out the conflict in Yugoslavia. The analytical material we are currently preparing for the Russian Federation president and the Security Council will also contain a forecast on the postwar development of the countries which were once part of Yugoslavia, and the Balkan region as a whole.

[Khrustov] It follows from what you have said that the task of the RSSI specialists is to analyze information, summarize it, and make forecasts. From what sources do you obtain this information?

[Kozhokin] From all kinds of sources: Russian and foreign scientific research centers, and the press. We also have official information—from ministries and departments.

[Khrustov] Do you rely on your colleagues from other institutes?

[Kozhokin] Of course, and we involve them very extensively in our work. This includes scientists from the Russian Academy of Sciences, for example, the United States of America and Canada Institute, the Europe Institute, and economic institutes, as well as associates of

departmental scientific research organizations and experts from various sociopolitical movements and organizations.

[Khrustov] What about colleagues abroad?

[Kozhokin] Yes, of course, them too. We understand the need for the broadest cooperation with foreign scientific centers and individual specialists for the purposes of an objective and comprehensive analysis of the problems being studied at expert level.

The RSSI is developing constructive relations with a whole range of state structures, political organizations, and scientific research centers of foreign countries. These include the North Atlantic Assembly, the NATO International Secretariat, the Atlantic Council, the Heritage Foundation (United States), the National Defense University (United States), the International Institute for Strategic Research (Britain), the International Peace Institute (Austria), and others. I can say that we have added to this list the Chinese Institute of Contemporary International Relations and the

PRC Academy of Social Sciences Institute of East European and Central Asian Countries, whose specialists were the RSSI's guests recently. [Kozhokin ends]

From Our Files: Yevgeniy Mikhaylovich Kozhokin is 40 years old. He is a graduate of the Moscow State University History Faculty and a candidate of historical sciences. He has worked in Russian Academy of Sciences institutes and has studied West European history (specialization—France).

He was a Russian Federation Supreme Soviet deputy in 1990-1993. He worked in the Committee for International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations, and then he headed the Subcommittee for International Security and Intelligence (in the Defense and Security Committee). His latest post was deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Committee for Affairs of the Federation and Nationalities.

Since April 1994 he has been director of the RSSI.

UKRAINE

Military Sci-Tech Education Trends, Tasks Described

94UM0384A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
21 Apr 94 p 2

[Article by Lt. Col. Mykola Hnidenko, chief of the Department of Science and Informatization of the Main Directorate of Military Education of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, candidate of technical sciences, docent, under the rubric "Building the Armed Forces of Ukraine: Experience, Problems, Prospects": "Military Science Should Already Be at Work"—first paragraph is NARODNA ARMIYA introduction]

[Text] On 23 March, NARODNA ARMIYA published an interview with Colonel Oleksandr Safronov, head of the scientific center of the Kiev Air Force Institute, who holds a doctorate in technical sciences and the title of professor. The interview dealt with the difficult problems involved in organizing the work of the scientific center's scientists, as well as in developing military science in general to enable it to provide for the needs of the Armed Forces and the military-industrial complex of Ukraine. In an afterword following the interview, we invited all those interested in these issues to join in the discussion. As part of this discussion, the editors have received an article from the Main Directorate of Military Education of the Ministry of Defense, which contains answers to some of the questions that were posed in the March interview. We offer this material to all interested specialists.

Military science in Ukraine is currently in a difficult situation. The result of historical circumstances has been such that now that Ukraine has become independent, 95 percent of her military-scientific potential is comprised of scientists at military educational institutions (vnz). Meanwhile, the system of organizing military-scientific research, which we inherited from the former Soviet Union, was focused mostly at military scientific-research institutions, almost all of which are located in Russia. Unfortunately, the military educational institutions played a secondary role in this system.

As a consequence of this kind of scientific-technical policy in the Armed Forces of the USSR, the normative documents that regulated the organization of scientific work did not provide for scientific research to be done by military educational institutions under direct contract from the Ministry of Defense, the branches [vydy] of the Armed Forces, and the component services [rody viysk]. Essentially, the educational institutions were barred from participating directly in developing new types of weapons, military equipment, etc. These were the prerogative of scientific-research institutes, test ranges [polihony], and the military-industrial complex.

The military educational institutions, including those that remained in Ukraine, lacked scientific subdivisions that could perform, if only partially, the functions of military scientific-research institutes. With some exceptions, the scientific potential of the military educational institutions was underutilized by the Ministry of Defense. As a result, the professors and instructors and the auditors and students [slukhachi ta kursanty], having had no opportunity

to be directly involved in scientific research, proved (as our "Soviet" experience demonstrates) unprepared to master new types of weapons quickly and at minimum cost. Unfortunately, they lack the tools for achieving new scientific results independently [vony ne volodiyut instrumentom samostiynoho zdobutku novykh naukovykh rezultativ], which makes their training [pidhotovka—preparation ?] economically unprofitable and thereby unable to meet today's needs.

This was one of the main reason why the level of training of a large portion of the graduates of the USSR's military schools failed to meet the standards with respect to the professional qualifications that their diplomas should have guaranteed. Small wonder that as a result of this circumstance military educational institutions were often accused of being too remote from military issues and that the dissertations and diploma projects of their graduates had little practical orientation and their practical application was slow.

Of course, this situation did not hold true for all military educational institutions. There were and still are among them academies and schools, at which the level of scientific work is high. These include, for example, the Military Engineering Radiotechnical Academy of the Air Defense Forces [PPO], the Kharkiv Higher Military Command Engineering School of Missile Troops, the Kiev Higher Engineering Radiotechnical School of the Air Defense Forces [PPO], the communications school, the aviation school, the Sevastopol Naval Engineering School. It was not by chance that these military educational institutions were chosen to serve as the foundation for establishing Ukraine's system of military education. But we should underscore once again that these institutions were exceptions to the rule. Even these "elite" military educational institutions had the shortcoming described above. The scientific-research subdivisions at these institutions were focused on narrow, primarily exploratory and theoretical research.

We should also draw attention to the legal status of military scientists. The normative-legal basis governing scientific work inherited by the Armed Forces of Ukraine prohibits military personnel from performing scientific research and teaching for additional pay by holding more than one job [vklyuchayuchy sumisnystvo posad]. It thus limits the rights of military scientists which are guaranteed by Ukraine's laws and deprives them of equal status with civilian specialists. These conditions have forced many military scientists, especially in our difficult times, to look for ways to apply their skills and talents outside the Armed Forces of Ukraine—in other ministries, departments, and in commercial structures...

In other words, it is necessary to work out fundamentally new documents to regulate scientific work in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. This need is dictated not only by the special features of the structure of the scientific-research institutions that remained in Ukraine after the division of the Armed Forces of the USSR, but also by the need to bring these features into conformity with the laws of Ukraine.

It is worth noting that the situation that exists in the field of scientific-technical work in other ministries and departments, as well as in Ukraine as a whole, is not much better.

One of the main reasons for this is inadequate funding of science. So far, the Law of Ukraine "On the Fundamental Principles of State Policy in the Sphere of Science and Scientific-Technical Activity..." has also not produced results.

There are thus two key tasks that need to be performed in the realm of building military science in Ukraine. The first is to create a scientifically well-founded, rational system of scientific-research institutions and organizations within the Ministry of Defense, which would include the scientific centers of military educational institutions, so that the needs of the Armed Forces and the military-industrial complex of Ukraine can be provided for in the shortest possible time. The second is to prepare a new normative-legal foundation for scientific work in the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

It should be recalled that as early as at the end of 1991, the concept for creating a system of military education of Ukraine stipulated the need for creating scientific centers within military educational institutions to assume some of the functions of the scientific-research institutes of the different branches of service. Thus their primary purpose would be to work together with the scientific-research institutions of the Ministry of Defense and other ministries and departments, as well as the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, to solve military-theoretical and military-technical problems as required by the branches of the Armed Forces and the component services.

A second and no less important task of the scientific centers, which is dictated by the state national program for "Education" ("Ukraine in the 21st Century"), is to promote the integration of science and education in military educational institutions.

The Main Directorate of Military Education is also developing a normative-legal base for scientific research. Thus, in order to provide the Armed Forces of Ukraine with a mechanism for realizing state guarantees for military personnel carrying out contracted work to produce scientific-technical output [naukovo-tekhnichna produktsiya], retaining and making wide use of the military's scientific potential in scientific research to serve the needs of the Ministry of Defense, and providing material incentives for those engaged in this research, the Department of Science and Informatization of the Main Directorate of Military Education has worked out a new Statute on the Procedure for Creating (Transferring) Scientific-Technical Output According to Contracts in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. This statute has been put into effect by an order of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine.

What does this document provide for that is fundamentally new?

First of all, the statute provides for both a directive and a contractual approach to the organization of scientific-technical work [NDR] in the Armed Forces of Ukraine and grants the right to military educational institutions, scientific centers, and other institutions and organizations of the Armed Forces that have the capacity for carrying out scientific-technical work to be the principal contractors to perform scientific-technical work for the Ministry of Defense.

Second, the commanders of military units and heads of institutions and organizations of the Ministry of Defense are granted the right to:

create temporary creative collectives with the participation of military personnel to perform contracted work to create (transmit) scientific-technical output;

permit military personnel to engage in scientific and creative activity to create scientific-technical output in military units and institutions and organizations of the Ministry of Defense, as well as in the institutions and organizations of Ukraine's other ministries and departments on terms that involve the combining of staffs [na umovakh shtatnoho sumisnytstva];

pay military personnel and other personnel [viyskovosluzhbovtsi i sluzhbovtsi] who take part in creating scientific-technical output on their own time [u pozasluzhbovyi chas];

establish bonuses for military personnel and other personnel, taking into account their individual creative contribution, for top-quality performance in creating scientific-technical output delivered to the client; there are to be no set limits in the amounts of individual bonuses;

pay military personnel and other personnel in accordance with effective legislation in Ukraine for providing expert opinions and consultation in military-scientific and military-technical research and development and on projects in the process of creating scientific-technical output.

At the same time, the statute provides an appropriate mechanism for supervising the activity of officials who are members of temporary creative collectives and engage in scientific work at more than one job [za sumisnytstvom].

Thus, military personnel in the Armed Forces of Ukraine are being provided with wide-ranging opportunities to realize their scientific and creative potential. It should be noted that the Armed Forces of Ukraine were the first among the armed forces of the former Union to take decisive steps in this direction.

We would like to note that this important document was worked out with the direct assistance of officers from the Department of Science and Informatization of the Main Directorate of Military Education Lt. Col. O. Babenko, Capt. third grade I. Dolhov, and Docent V. Tkachenko, chief specialist of the department and candidate of technical sciences, as well as specialists from military educational institutions, scientific centers, and the Armaments Staff [shtab ozbroynnya] of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The latter include Lt. Gen. I. Olenovych, Maj. Gen. O. Kovtunencko, colonels O. Matov, A. Dorovskyy, O. Safronov, M. Lukhanin, V. Kasatkin, V. Sereda, and others.

But the sphere of activity involved in creating a system of scientific-research institutions in the Armed Forces of Ukraine is much broader and its problems go well beyond those raised in this article. Therefore, all specialists and scientists, all those who are involved in this work, must make a great effort and exhibit enough will, wisdom, and patience to realize the goal that has been set to develop military science in Ukraine.

BELARUS

Structure of Belarussian Armed Forces

94UM0417A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
27 Apr 94 p 2

[Article by Col. Valeriy Kovalev under "National Armies: View of an Observer" rubric: "Who Is Marching Under the White-Red-White Banner?"]

[Text] Two years ago, in March 1992, the Supreme Soviet of Belarus passed a resolution on the preservation of the Republic Armed Forces. And as early as May, they organized a Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Belarus, which began to implement this resolution.

In contrast to some other republics of the former Union, Belarus did not have to begin to build a national army from scratch. It inherited from the Armed Forces of the USSR a powerful force grouping numbering about 170,000 men and equipped with the most up-to-date combat equipment and armament—Belarussian Military District, an air army, a separate air defense army, an airborne division, large rear bases, arsenals, and depots. It was on this solid foundation that the Belarussian Armed Forces were established.

One must give credit to the higher leadership of the Republic and to the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Belarus: they did not force the process artificially. Everything possible was done to see to it that the transformation of the Republic's Armed Forces took place smoothly and without severe disruptions of the fate of individuals. People with shoulder straps were given the opportunity to think and to get their bearings. This made it possible to avoid a mass outflow of military personnel from the Republic. By the end of 1992, they had concluded the legal formation of the Armed Forces and the military doctrine of Belarus was affirmed. On 31 December of that year, officers and warrant officers swore allegiance to the Republic. And only after this did the second and principal stage in the establishment of the Armed Forces begin—the reduction of the numerical strength of the forces and the transition to a new organizational and personnel structure.

According to the plan, it will continue until 1 January 1995. In the opinion of Col.-Gen. Pavel Kozlovskiy, minister of defense of the Republic of Belarus, however, the basic tasks in the reduction and reform of the Armed Forces have practically been completed already and as time goes on their appearance will not change substantially.

What does the Belarussian Army look like after two years of "swimming by itself." A higher leadership and command agencies have been established and are functioning: the Ministry of Defense and the main staff. The next step is that of the Army corps that are replacing tank and combined-arms armies. There are three of them. The 28th Army Corps includes three separate mechanized brigades, a base for the storage of armament and equipment (BKhVT), and a set of corps units. They include units of missile forces and artillery, signal troops, and engineer troops. The Seventh Army Corps is made up of mechanized brigades, three BKhVT, and units subordinate to the corps. The Fifth Army Corps has two BKhVT and a set of corps units. If necessary, the bases for the storage of arms and equipment can form mechanized brigades.

Thus, the mechanized brigade is the basic combat unit of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus that is independently capable of performing the tasks of mobile defense. It has four or five battalions: one or two tank and two or three mechanized battalions. It numbers from 3,000 to 5,000 men. According to specialists, the brigade in this form is not so far behind the previous division in firepower but is more mobile than the latter and is better commanded.

The air forces have likewise undergone some changes. Instead of the former aviation regiments and divisions, nine air bases of different purposes have been established. Several antiaircraft missile brigades and regiments and individual air defense groups form the basis of the republic's air defense forces. The separate 120th Guard Rogachevskaya Motorized Rifle Division and the 103rd Airborne Division that are part of the ground forces represent a real power.

In the process of reform, the Armed Forces were subjected to significant cuts. In 1992-1993, almost 13,000 officers and warrant officers were discharged from them. There are a little over 100,000 men "under arms" at the present time. The strength of the armed forces will be reduced to approximately 80-85,000 by the beginning of 1995. In short, the emphasis has been put on the establishment of a relatively small army that performs purely defensive functions. The Ministry of Defense considers that numerical losses must be compensated through up-to-date armament and equipment, high proficiency of personnel, and qualified command cadres.

It is another matter whether the Republic will be able to maintain this potential at the same level in the future. This is by no means a rhetorical question. Belarus, just as the other states of the CIS, is experiencing an extremely serious economic crisis. This year the military department has been allocated a sum that amounts to only four percent of the Republic budget. It is asserted in the finance-economic directorate of the Ministry of Defense that this money is sufficient for only the most urgent needs.

In the words of Aleksandr Tushinskiy, first deputy minister of defense of the Republic of Belarus, many other problems affecting the combat readiness of the Republic's Armed Forces are arising because of the limited financial possibilities. As everyone knows, one of its most important components is the proficiency of personnel. There is combat training in the forces but it is becoming more and more difficult to organize it. In the units of the Air Force, for example, they are talking with concern about the logged flight hours of pilots approaching a critical level of only 20-30 hours. In the ground troops, the shortage of vehicle resources is forcing the lion's share of exercises to be carried out without taking equipment and people to the training centers. Simulators help out to some extent but there are not enough of them.

The meager budget of the military department gives rise to still another serious problem. It is a matter of the social protection of service personnel. The government and Ministry of Defense of the Republic are making considerable effort to provide tolerable conditions for them in their service and daily life. In two years it was possible to cut almost in half the number of officers without apartments.

Last year the housing stock of the Ministry of Defense was increased by almost 3,000 apartments. By 1 January 1995 it is planned to reduce the number of those waiting for housing by another 3,000. But even after this there will still be more than 7,000 families waiting....

Dissatisfaction with their current material situation is forcing many military personnel under various pretexts to leave the service for the reserves or to go over to the armies of other countries of the CIS. According to the personnel directorate of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Belarus, the shortage of platoon leaders alone is now 700 men and this number continues to grow. The Armed Forces of the Republic now have more than 1,500 vacancies for officer positions, mostly pilots and communications personnel. The once abundant flow of applications from officers desiring to return to their homeland has practically dried up—the conditions of service do not suit them. The personnel problem is being made worse by the fact that the two military schools in the Republic cannot provide for the training of officer cadres in all specialties. Cadets have to be sent to Russia for schooling. And this is not inexpensive these days.

This year it is proposed to begin the transition to contract service but these plans had to be postponed for an indefinite time. The reason is the same as before.

One could continue for some time the list of difficulties that the Belarussian Army encountered in the phase of its formation. Alas, there is one root to most of them—the acute shortage of financing. Apparently, in making the decision to establish their own armed forces, the higher levels of authority in the republic were not entirely clear about what their support will cost.

The past two years have made it quite obvious that much more funding than was thought will be required to maintain even a relatively small but up-to-date and well-armed army that is really capable of defending the sovereignty of the state. The matter is clear: either the Armed Forces will obtain at least the minimum that is needed and they will survive or they must be given up entirely. There is no third choice.

It appears that they have recognized this in the Government of Belarus. In speaking to generals and officers recently on the results of a command and staff exercise, Prime Minister of the Republic of Belarus Vyacheslav Kebich declared that the Council of Ministers of the Republic is greatly concerned about the situation developing in the Armed Forces. He also assured them that the government of the Republic will persistently pursue the course of close cooperation in the area of defense with other countries of the CIS and above all with Russia, which will make it possible to develop the military with fewer expenditures and greater efficiency.

DEFENSE INDUSTRY

Competitiveness, Profitability of Russian Weapons

94UM0419A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
26 Apr 94 pp 1-2

[Interview with Yu. A. Kuznetsov, designer of ground radar detection stations, by Nikolay Poroskov: "Our Armament Is Competitive and It Is Advantageous To Sell It Abroad"]

[Text] Yuriy Aleksandrovich Kuznetsov was born in 1935 in Krasnoyarsk Kray. He finished the radio engineering department of Tomsk Polytechnical Institute. He was head of a laboratory and section, director of a research institute, and general director of a scientific-production association. Since 1987 he has been general designer of ground radar detection stations. He is the chief designer of radar detection stations that are part of the antiaircraft missile systems C-300 of various modifications.

He is a candidate of technical sciences and a winner of the Lenin Prize. He has been awarded orders and medals.

[Poroskov] Yuriy Aleksandrovich, for the first time in many years domestic radar equipment, including for military purposes, was openly presented to the world at the international exhibitions "IDEX-93" in Abu Dhabi, "LIMA-93" in Malaysia, and FIDAE-94 in Chile. Our developers and producers were able to see the level of development of radar in the world. Who presented products?

[Kuznetsov] According to our information, most of the countries and firms participated that are involved in the development of ground detection stations: General Electric and Westinghouse (United States), Alenia (Italy), Marconi (Great Britain), Siemens (Germany), and firms from South Africa and China. Unfortunately, the Japanese and French did not demonstrate their radar.

[Poroskov] What is the level of development of radar stations in the world today? What are the trends in the use of wavebands, antenna systems, and computer technology?

[Kuznetsov] The bands are still the traditional ones, the centimeter and decimeter bands. As a rule, radar for the detection of low-flying targets determines the range and azimuth, but not the altitude, that is, there are two coordinates. Stations for medium and high altitudes operate with three coordinates. The processing of the signals, as a rule, is digital and the detection of the targets and measurement of the coordinates is automated. Also automated are measures against interference. The stations have control and simulators that can imitate the air situation. All of this is with the use of computer systems. There is a clear striving to improve the mobility of the systems. Basically the areas of development here and abroad coincide.

[Poroskov] It must be assumed that you received exhaustive information at the exhibitions. Does this mean that the West is truly open to us and is keeping no secrets?

[Kuznetsov] It is by no means so. Yes, we did receive brochures or information sheets on almost all the foreign radar systems. But it is difficult to obtain information that

goes beyond this. In Abu Dhabi, for example, representatives of the Marconi firm avoided answers and did not give out any brochures. At "LIME-93," they were in part "corrected."

Of course we frequently were interested in technical and design-technological solutions and the firms are not interested in reporting on this. But we also did not always receive answers to questions on purely user characteristics. An exception was the Republic of South Africa—we received answers to all questions if they did not involve know-how.

[Poroskov] What did our country demonstrate at the exhibitions and how did our equipment look next to foreign models?

[Kuznetsov] Practically all of our stations were unique. The radar stations "Nebo" and "Nebo-SV" of the meter band attracted the attention of visitors in that they are capable of detecting targets built using "Stealth" technology (the so-called "invisibles"), are not very susceptible to weather phenomena, and have a better capability of detecting highly accurate weapons. At the same time, the stations themselves are protected against missiles that home in on radio emissions. They simply do not exist in the meter band and it is problematical to build them.

The stations "Kasta-2E1" and "Kasta-2E2" for the detection of low-flying targets are fundamentally different from foreign models in that they have the possibility of raising an antenna on a special 50-meter tower, smaller losses in the signal channel, qualitative selection of targets, and a greater operating range. And "Kasta-2E2" also has the possibility of determining the altitude (echelon) of targets.

Also looking rather good in comparison with the others were the radar stations for autonomous target designation in the structure of the antiaircraft missile system "BukM1" and the systems S-300P and S-300V. This is primarily because in the foreign antiaircraft missile systems of a similar caliber the surveillance detection radar is not used, that is, the antiaircraft missile system cannot work autonomously but only by receiving target designations from the means of the radar field. Under our system, they come from radio engineering subunits.

Our radar stations set up on one transport unit on a caterpillar or automotive chassis are mobile with a high cross-country capability and have a large zone of coverage at the angle of site.

[Poroskov] Everything that you have said is certainly pleasing. But the reader may get the impression that we are ahead of the entire planet in radar.

[Kuznetsov] Because of the better performance of the computer systems and element base, the radar of other countries has better indicators with respect to size of equipment, reliability, and input, and in a number of cases they have a better design and more comfort.

[Poroskov] How can we utilize their experience?

[Kuznetsov] We can employ their element base in our stations. International cooperation in developments and the production of computer technology is a normal phenomenon.

[Poroskov] Who took an interest in the Russian exhibit and to what extent?

[Kuznetsov] Specialists from manufacturing firms, army and police officers, representatives of intermediary and commercial firms, and the press—from different regions of the world. Much interest was shown, especially in Abu Dhabi. The visitors took the entire supply of information sheets, 200 to 250 for each radar, and had positive comments.

[Poroskov] There is a persistent opinion that Russia is selling military equipment at prices significantly below world prices.

[Kuznetsov] Even in the event that our radar is sold at prices 40 to 50 percent below those of analogous foreign equipment, we can make good profit because of the relatively low wages in Russia. Competitiveness is determined not only by quality (although we do have quality) but also by price in terms of the effectiveness/cost criteria. Our equipment can be quite competitive. It was not so long ago that Japan broke into the world market mainly because it had the lowest prices in the world. Our situation is now analogous with respect to radar equipment.

[Poroskov] To trade successfully, it is necessary to have the appropriate system and experience. Have we gained this in distant countries?

[Kuznetsov] I think that we need to show our equipment more abroad and to advertise it. They are not sufficiently familiar with it everywhere. It is also expedient to have an exhibition in the territory of Russia that guests of the country could visit. A second question is whether it should be a unified exhibition or dispersed by branch sections, whether it should always be for many branches or have periodically changing exhibits. It will be useful to have exhibits that are always ready to be sent to any international exhibition. It is desirable to accompany every presentation of military equipment that is being offered for sale with a demonstration on the test range with interested persons invited from other countries.

[Poroskov] It is clear from the international practice in the weapons trade that it is not a matter just of sales. A buyer acquiring a radar system ties himself to the manufacturing country for a long time.

[Kuznetsov] And when we sell equipment, it is necessary for us to offer servicing and joint operation. Developing countries are especially interested in this, but specialists from states with a high standard of living are not eager to go to them. This will raise the competitiveness of our products.

An offer of joint production of equipment being offered for sale may be a decisive factor for a country interested in the development of its own defense industry, especially if the level of employment of the population is low there.

The obligation of our country to improve sold equipment may also be attractive for a buyer, naturally for additional payment.

[Poroskov] Could all of this be offered by "Oboroneksport" (its functions have now gone over to "Rosvooruzheniye") representing Russia at exhibitions? And

are not the creators of the equipment—designers and manufacturers—being left out?

[Kuznetsov] They must play a dominant role in the arms trade. Of course not everyone has sufficient experience in commerce today. What is needed is joint work with organizations specializing in the arms trade. The latter frequently exaggerate their own possibilities and strive to make deals independently and without consultation with developers and manufacturers. They work under the principle "sold and forgotten." Unqualified decisions can do harm. What can be sold, to whom, and how much must be decided by the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The rest should be left to industry.

[Poroskov] Attempts were repeatedly made to break away from the monopoly of one department (Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations) in foreign trade with weapons....

[Kuznetsov] The state monopoly in this area ought to be implemented through the issue of licenses and the establishment of quotas. Under this condition, industrial enterprises should be allowed to trade directly. And they should be given the right to utilize a middleman. That is the procedure in trade throughout the world.

[Poroskov] Apparently there are traditions and rules in the world for the organization of exhibitions. How did we, generally novices, look there?

[Kuznetsov] The absence of models of some systems, the low quality of map cases, brochures, and information sheets and the inadequate amount of information did not encourage visitors to stay longer at our exhibit. In the main catalog for the exhibition in Abu Dhabi, Russia was presented on just one page. For other countries, they provided maps of the pavilions and notes on each stand with the addresses of the firms. At the end of the catalog was a subject index, with the help of which it was possible to find the stands for a subject of interest to the visitor for all the firms and countries except Russia.

Most of the foreign firms began to publish materials on the exhibited arms four or five months prior to the exhibition. We did extremely little advertising, and we did not prepare in advance meetings with representatives of other firms for closer cooperation.

[Poroskov] Still, Yuriy Aleksandrovich, our products appeared worthy despite the organizational shortcomings, and you apparently did sign some contracts for the delivery of radar systems.

[Kuznetsov] The first exhibitions could not give quick results, and there were no preliminary negotiations. But the interest that was shown in our equipment and its competitiveness allow us to expect some offers in the near future.

[Poroskov] In selling equipment abroad, are you not risking leaving your own army without radar stations?

[Kuznetsov] Because of the poor financing, the Ministry of Defense was forced to reduce purchases of our output substantially. In 1992-93, significantly less funding was allocated even to research and experimental design work. Trade abroad helps to maintain the potential of the industry, and this is the basis for the defense capability.

Decree Privatizing Korolev Missile Builders

*PM1905121594 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 17 May 94 First Edition p 4*

[Decree No. 415 of the Russian Federation Government "On the Creation of the S.P. Korolev 'Energiya' Space Rocket Corporation," signed by V. Chernomyrdin, chairman of the Russian Federation Government, and dated Moscow, 29 April 1994]

[Text] With a view to ensuring the creation and operation of intricate space complexes and economic and scientific systems in market economy conditions, bearing in mind the special role of the "Energiya" Science-and-Production Association named for Academician S.P. Korolev in the development of space exploration, and in accordance with the State Program for the Privatization of State and Municipal Enterprises in the Russian Federation [RF] and RF Presidential Edict No. 237 of 4 February 1994 "On the Procedure for Privatizing the 'Energiya' Science-and-Production Association named for Academician S.P. Korolev," the RF Government decrees that:

1. The proposal submitted by the labor collectives of the "Energiya" Science-and-Production Association named for Academician S.P. Korolev (Kaliningrad City, Moscow Oblast) and its Primorsk subsidiary (Primorsk City, Leningrad Oblast), which forms part of it as a corporate entity—a proposal coordinated with the RF State Committee for the Defense Sectors of Industry and the RF State Committee for the Management of State Property [Goskomimushchestvo]—on the creation, on the basis of the above association and its subsidiary, of the "Energiya" Space Rocket Corporation named for S.P. Korolev (hereinafter called the Corporation) as an open-type joint-stock company is accepted.
2. It is established that the Corporation is the rightful heir of the "Energiya" Science-and-Production Association named for Academician S.P. Korolev and its Primorsk subsidiary, forming part of it as a corporate entity.
3. The RF Goskomimushchestvo is to implement the measures envisaged by RF legislation to transform the "Energiya" Science-and-Production Association named for Academician S.P. Korolev and its Primorsk subsidiary into a single complex.
4. The RF Goskomimushchestvo is to:
 - a) Implement the privatization of the Corporation, making provision for:
 - the assigning to federal ownership for a three-year period of 51 percent of the ordinary (voting) shares, comprising 38 percent of the total number of Corporation shares;
 - the provision of concessions to labor collective members in accordance with Option 1 ratified by the State Program for the Privatization of State and Municipal Enterprises in the RF;
 - the formation of a flotation fund for enterprise personnel of 10 percent of the total number of shares;
 - the organization of a sale of 12 percent of the shares in the Corporation at a closed check auction;

- b) Submit within a month to the RF Government the Corporation's draft charter, formulated with consideration for the special features of its organizational structure and science-and-production tasks and envisaging the possibility of converting privileged shares into ordinary shares on the expiry of a two-year period from the time of state registration of the Corporation and the candidacy of representatives of state management organs on the Corporation's board of directors, along with a proposal to instruct the Corporation's board of directors to represent the state's interests at a meeting of shareholders in respect of the shares in federal ownership;

- c) Transfer property in federal ownership which is not subject to privatization on contract conditions to the full economic jurisdiction of the Corporation by agreement with the RF State Committee for the Defense Sectors of Industry.

5. Yuriy Pavlovich Semenov, general director of the "Energiya" Science-and-Production Association named for Academician S.P. Korolev and general designer, is appointed president of the Corporation for the period until the first meeting of its shareholders.
6. The Government of Moscow and the administrations of Moscow, Leningrad, and Samara Oblasts and Stavropol and Krasnodar Krays are to register, in accordance with prescribed procedure, the fact that the Corporation is assigned the plots of land occupied by the "Energiya" Science-and-Production Association named for Academician S.P. Korolev for indefinite use along with those allocated for facilities at the planning and construction stage.
7. The Corporation is given the right of immediate appeal to the RF Government on questions of exempting it and its subsidiaries from paying property tax and all categories of payment for land.
8. As of 1994 the RF Ministry of the Economy and the RF Ministry of Finance are to envisage granting the Corporation preferential credits and state guarantees in respect of hard-currency loans and also provide targeted budgetary funding and allocate centralized capital investments for work carried out under the Russian Federal Space Program and also under intergovernmental agreements.

Sukhoi-35 Flies Aerobatics at Kubinka Show

*PM2305135394 Moscow Russian Television Network
in Russian 1920 GMT 14 May 94*

[From the "Vesti" newscast: Video report from Kubinka air show by V. Tarasov, A. Vozzhov, identified by caption; figures in brackets denote broadcast time in GMT in hours, minutes, and seconds]

[Text] [193608] [Tarasov over air show footage] Russia's best pilots displayed their skills at the Kubinka airfield near Moscow today. This was the third event of its kind. This year it was held within the framework of the "Aircraft Engines-94" international exhibition.

A wide range of Air Force equipment was on show, from the old Tu-95 long-range aircraft, which has been in the arsenal for more than 40 years now, to the super-modern

Su-35. During a demonstration flight of the latter, test pilot Viktor Pugachev performed a new aerobatic maneuver for the numerous spectators. For the time being it has been dubbed a "sideways cobra." [video shows maneuver] Spectators were enraptured by the amazingly harmonious demonstration flights performed by pilots of the Kubinka Flight Center. [video shows formation flight]

Experts and interested onlookers were able to observe the Tu-160 strategic bomber and Ka-50 front support helicopter at work.

Characteristically, this grand event had been prepared by frontline aviation officers with the active support of numerous sponsors and aircraft enthusiasts. [193720] [video shows marchpast, parachute display, Tu-95, Su-35, Tu-160, and Ka-50 in flight, two formation flights]

DOCTRINAL ISSUES

Serebryakov on Russian Military Doctrine

94UM0425A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 8 Feb 94 p 5

[Article by Igor Serebryakov: "Russian Military Doctrine: Why Should Our Army Fight in its Own Country?"]

[Text] Life taught us many things over the past few years. It taught us not to believe in coincidences, not to trust promises of politicians, edicts of the president or actions of the government. This is why hasty adoption of Russia's new military doctrine evoked a large number of questions in the minds of servicemen, and not only them.

And, although all political analysis best serves its purpose before the fact, even now it still probably not too late to analyze the essence and meaning of the document that has become the basic formula for the country's defense.

Such a document has, of course, been needed for a long time. This need arises directly from the state's desire to change its internal structure, ideology, and mutual relations. In addition, all of Russia's citizens need to finally be given an idea of what is happening with the military in our country, and of what the authorities intend to do, and not to do, in shaping our new military policy. And obviously the process of fundamental transformations in all spheres of state activity should be reflected in military doctrine.

Such a document was drafted, according to plan in some respects, and spontaneously in others. Military doctrine matured gradually in staff work in the forces, in seminars held by military VUZ [higher educational institution] departments, and in the research programs of scientific centers. Thousands of people worked on it, and just in 1993 six doctorate and over 20 candidate dissertations were defended, a number of scientific discoveries were made, and hundreds of interesting proposals were offered in the course of preparation of the new military doctrine.

The doctrine's authors had probably been tasked to gather together and generalize the results of the labor of military specialists. However, the document accounts for none of the proposals originating at the local level.

The convictions and interests of the people who are to implement the doctrine—the military themselves—were left unaddressed. Which is why it has come to be widely held in

Moscow's academies that the new doctrine was adopted so suddenly that, by the very fact of its existence, it would keep any other concept from making an appearance—for example, one proposing a professional army.

As we know, any army can man itself by two principles—voluntarily or by compulsion. The Russian Army has traditionally formed on the basis of the compulsory principle.

Following the lead of journalists and scientists, three years ago many generals began boldly saying that it is impossible for a compulsory army to become a professional one. But now, the idea of a professional army is brought to mind at the top with increasing rarity. Cozy offices in the staff buildings of the old, tested army, which preferred to fight not with ability but with numbers, have been found for all of the progressive generals.

The idea of strict selection and high quality training of servicemen has been reduced to clumsy half-measures, like service by enlisted men on the basis of contracts. Supported neither socially nor economically, the contract service program has transformed into a joke, discrediting the very idea of a professional army in Russia. Contract service has attracted chiefly those who are seeking easy money or are at odds with the law. Both the special and the general educational training of these soldiers is so low that the textbooks commanders usually use for training in the troops are over their heads. Pressing people into contract service, the military commissariats fulfill the plans dictated to them from above "at any cost," even going so far as to deceive both the contract soldiers themselves and the officers under whose leadership these people will have to serve. Something said by one of the commanders of a battalion manned by such a "contingent" has now swept through a good half of the Army: "So what did that military commissar do, make a deal with a prison camp chief?"

The so-called combined principle of manning the Armed Forces proclaimed in the new military doctrine enables the military leadership to enlist the state's human resources without any sort of quality control, taking its cue not from conscription needs but from a reluctance to complicate its life.

The generals don't understand that signing contracts with willing persons isn't enough—the entire system of selection and combat training of soldiers has to be changed fundamentally. Such a requirement conflicts with the fundamental, historically evolved method by which our troops have waged war. Russian generals have never paid attention to losses, generously fertilizing the future with the bones of their soldiers. And this "science of winning" is perhaps the only thing in which the continuity of the generations of Russian generals clearly expresses itself.

However, there is one other, more important circumstance: The subconscious notion that the Army serves as a prison for a part of our people continues to foil attempts to create professional armed forces in our country. The isolation potential of the barracks has been expertly utilized in Russia since day one. When in past centuries a revolutionary situation evolved in Finland or Poland, the emperor defused it by mass conscription of youngsters from the restless regions into the army. But we went even further: Conscriptions are conducted regularly, from all regions. It has gotten to the point where all of our men

serve in the army, and all are made equal in the ranks. And it was only in our country that the word "simple" sounded so much like praise, while "complex" ("special") was perceived as something negative. The individual was compelled to conceal his uniqueness, and was ashamed of his individuality. Keeping his opinions to himself, gradually he lost his ability to hold an opinion, he forgot how to think, he ceased thinking. The ideal warrior! How could you refuse such easy-to-manage soldiers?

But let's return to the military doctrine. First of all, let's define the location of this document in the coordinates of the country's sociopolitical life in 1993. Let's consider the chronology: October—the tragedy at the White House; November—the presidential edict approving the "Fundamental Principles of Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation"; December—the national referendum on the new Constitution and elections to the Russian parliament. Such a sequence of events makes you wonder. The question that arises right away is this: What should come first? The fundamental law of the state, or its military doctrine? The answer is obvious. First we adopt the constitution, and then the military doctrine. If that were what happened, we would certainly have heard loud demands to reconcile the fundamental principles of the military doctrine to the constitution's postulates. It would not be easy to ignore such demands at any level of authority. But were the sequence of adoption of the documents to be changed, as was done in our case, the military doctrine would become a given, claiming priority of its principles over constitutional principles.

The hands of politicians in military actions have been untied for all time, the Armed Forces turn out to be independent of the constitution, and military affairs are dependably screened from public scrutiny.

The inconsistency between the actual tenor of Army life and constitutional norms is so astounding that it requires separate discussion. The new Russian Constitution, no matter what criticism it may endure, nonetheless does devote a sizable amount of room to the individual, declaring the rights and liberties of the individual. But real military life is characterized at the moment objective lawlessness and lack of freedom. The military doctrine takes no account at all of human rights in any of its premises. "Labor is free. Each shall have the right to do whatever he wishes with his working abilities, and to select his nature of activity and occupation.... Compulsory labor is forbidden," states Article 37 of the Constitution. But, in the meantime, the Army continues to stand on involuntary labor, and the military doctrine confirms manning predominantly on the basis of the compulsory principle for the foreseeable future.

Or, "...each shall have the right to freedom and inviolability of the person. Arrest...shall be based only on court rulings," declares Article 22 of the Constitution. Reading this, we would have to assume that our Army's disciplinary regulations have now been rescinded.

And once again, "...the home is sacred. No one shall have the right to enter a home against the will of persons residing therein." This is from Article 25 of the Russian Constitution. But according to the disciplinary regulations, the barracks (officers' dormitories) are not homes, and

privates and NCOs (officers) residing therein are not protected by the Constitution.

There are many examples of this sort. Also among them is a highly significant one. According to Article 27 of the Constitution, "...anyone who is lawfully present on territory of the Russian Federation shall have the right to travel freely." To people knowing what military service is like, any comment would be superfluous in this regard.

A strange picture develops. With one hand the state gives normal rights and liberties to the military as well as the rest of the citizens of Russia, but with its other hand it confirms a document in which these rights are not foreseen. Which document is to be followed by a military chief? And by subordinates? Perhaps Article 45 of the Constitution, which states that "...each shall have the right to defend his rights and liberties by all means not prohibited by law"? Our Army will become a strange spectacle when some will be lawfully infringing upon the rights of others, while those others will be lawfully defending them.

After all of this, I have this great urge to call the military doctrine a political propaganda document oriented on objectives far from those of strengthening the country's defense capabilities. But let's wait a little. Let's think on this a little more. First let's agree on the basic concepts.

Military doctrine is defined as a system of views, adopted by the state for a given period of time (stipulated in the doctrine itself), upon the essence, nature and goals of possible war, and upon the program of preparations for it by the state and the armed forces. The fundamental principles of military doctrine are based on the society's social and political structure, the state of its economy, and the geopolitical situation of the country and its probable adversaries. The military doctrines of all states have been written on the basis of this matrix, which is then filled in with the content of the political programs of the governments and ruling parties of these states.

Military doctrine takes on a meaning of its own only when the concept central to it comes into being—a probable adversary. Then the defense program acquires its special military orientation. And, developing with regard for the forces and resources of the potential opponent, it establishes what forces and resources it needs for war and in preparation for it. Military doctrine simply has no meaning when a probable adversary is not defined. You can't prepare for war against an unknown adversary, without knowing the direction from which the blow might come. It is impossible to organize military professional training, carry out defensive measures, select armament systems, position the forces, determine their combat readiness, and assign military reconnaissance tasks.

It is impossible to set the upper limit of the material needs of the state and the Army for preparing and conducting warfare. When the probable adversary is left unnamed, claims by the general officers and leaders of the military-industrial complex upon any given percentage of the national income would be justified. But in the new Russian military doctrine the probable adversary isn't even defined approximately. The authors of this document believe "...wars and military conflicts to be the main danger to stability and peace." But almost all officers with whom I've

discussed the doctrine shake their heads at this in bewilderment: Does this mean that war is what creates the danger of war?

But looking at things objectively, can we really say that Russia is threatened by no one? Have absolute tranquility and international harmony really settled over the world? Are there really no countries, with interests opposite to those of our state, making territorial, economic and even political claims upon us? And where, I'd like to know, are the nuclear missiles of the USA, France and England still aimed? And what about China's? Aren't they still aimed at us? Isn't this also true of conventional missiles as well?

Once upon a time an adversary did attack Russia, catching our people and Army by surprise because the political ambitions of certain individuals precluded the possibility of a professional military approach to defense. The one true lesson of history is that no one is learning anything from it.

The Soviet Union's military doctrine believed the developed capitalist countries, and chiefly the United States, to be the probable adversary. This provided the possibility for purposefully developing the economy and military science, and carrying out political training of the troops. The corresponding army mentality evolved, and the professional skills of fighting a specifically indicated adversary were practiced over many long decades.

By inertia, many commanders continue to develop these same skills in their subordinates, while realizing deep within their souls that such independent activity contradicts all of the state's policy today. But what are commanders to do? Nothing new has been proposed to them. Nothing different is being taught to them. Nothing specific is being said.

When asked in a recent training exercise in a certain Siberian division whom they would most likely go to war with, one out of every three privates didn't have an answer, while one out of every five, after some hemming and hawing, finally named the United States, or Iraq, or Germany, or China, or Georgia, or Abkhazia. The most interesting thing is that all of them could be right. After all, in addition to the traditional missions, the new military doctrine presupposes peacekeeping operations—stationing the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation outside the country. Such actions are already a reality, and there are serious apprehensions that they could occur with much greater frequency in the future. And then our youngsters will be going to new Afghanistans, new Angolas, new Karabakhs. They will go to render international assistance, to rescue some government, to correct someone's mistakes. They will go to their deaths, "rectifying death by death."

Why is a probable adversary not indicated in our doctrine? Could it be that the country's leadership knows who he is, but is afraid to anger him, while not being afraid to anger its own army? Or, having accomplished a unique, radical revolution in all military science, could it be that the president of Russia and his Ministry of Defense have decided to keep this opponent secret from their own army? Or could it be that having no political course to follow, no ideological values, our politicians are hoping to be good friends with everyone in the international arena?

There are many suppositions, but there is still only one question: Do the authors of the new military doctrine realize that by not indicating a probable adversary in it, and thus asking their country and army to prepare for war with any old state, we are willingly or unwillingly putting the entire world on our list of potential foes?

Military doctrine has two sides—sociopolitical and military-technical. The former embraces issues pertaining to the economic, social, and legal principles of accomplishing the goals of a future war. This side is determined by the society's main political objectives. But we didn't have such objectives at the moment of approval of the doctrine. They were formulated later on in the Constitution. Therefore, the military doctrine was unable to express the views of the state on the possible nature of wars and military conflicts, or define the principles and directions of development of the Armed Forces. We will find nothing on the list of measures to be carried out up to the second millennium that would offer evidence of the seriousness of plans to reform the Army and "get combat-capable, modern forces as a result."

The military-technical side of doctrine is a more utilitarian concept. It includes questions of the strategy and tactics of combat activities, the equipment supplied to the Armed Forces, and their professional training. This side of doctrine legalizes the complex mutual relations of army structures with the military-industrial and scientific complexes, and with the central and local administrations, and in a sense documents processes that have been taking shape over the course of years and decades. The military-technical side of doctrine cannot objectively come into being before all of these relations are fully evolved and stabilized. Have they already stabilized in the Russian Army? Are all ties set up and working in exemplary fashion? Can the quality of the personal and financial support provided to the Army today be taken as the model?

But the section of the doctrine that expounds the concept of activity in the military-technical area is especially surprising. This section is presented in the new military doctrine as if its authors bear not even a suspicion of the state economy's devastation, of the extremely deep financial crisis, or of the social cataclysms. Had economists gone over this document before it was cast in stone by politicians and the military? Had they asked their traditional question: "What's the bottom line?"? What is the bottom line of operational restoration of the extremely expensive military infrastructure—the new airfields, the transportation net, the components of the air defense and missile systems, the military posts? What will be the cost of withdrawing forces back into this country and accommodating them, of introducing a new manning system, of participating in regional military conflicts, of making personnel changes in the Armed Forces, and of maintaining retired military personnel, whose numbers are continually growing with the Army's reduction? And that's far from everything. Every item, every word of the new military doctrine means billions upon billions of rubles.

Having lost much of our order of battle with the disintegration of the USSR, our Army is presently in a woeful state. There was a time when it was built upon the principles of integration, of supporting all theaters of

military operations with unified air defense systems and air forces, of conducting combat operations with regard for the possibilities of the Navy and Strategic Missile Forces. These principles have now been violated. Such an army no longer exists. Troops and equipment of the strongest first-line districts departed together with Ukraine and Belarus, which totally devastated the complex structure of the country's entire defense, and laid bare the Western Sector. The tragic events in the Caucasus, in the Dnestr region, and in Azerbaijan and Tajikistan severed all lines of communications almost entirely, thus depriving the dozens of units stationed in these regions of the possibility of conducting combat activities. These formations are feeling the shortage of personnel more and more keenly. In turn, the absence of resources and of proper personal conditions makes it impossible for the Ministry of Defense to relocate ground forces and form some sort of workable system out of them.

The Strategic Missile Forces have found themselves in a situation in which a significant fraction of their launchers are on the other side of Russia's borders. Moreover, all such facilities require the constant attention of specialists, whom no CIS country but Russia has. Imagine what awaits the launchers in the absence of constant maintenance. And how is such maintenance to be carried out abroad? How are these facilities to be transferred to the other country if they are controlled from a single center? How much resources will it take to reorient the flight assignments in order to plug the holes formed in our country's nuclear missile shield? Still, despite everything, and owing exclusively to the heroism of their own officers, the Russian missile forces are maintaining their combat readiness.

The country's air defense system, which has been ravaged by numerous reorganizations, is in dire need of radical improvement of all of its technical resources, and of more effective coordination of its actions with other armed forces. Strategic aviation suffers from a shortage of fuel and personnel, and it chronically lacks the resources for practical training of specialists. Torn apart by conflicts, the navy is desperately trying to preserve its unity and fighting capability, and to reject the old combat equipment others insist it must accept.

The Army has been strangled by housing and personal problems. Officers haven't been paid for several months. There are not enough enlisted men, and "mestnichestvo," "dedovshchina," harassment and favoritism flourish in the units. Servicemen uprooted from Russian soil have lost all hope of returning to their motherland. They are in despair. The one thing they have been capable of is armed defense of their children, their wives, and their families against bands of nationalists.

In these times, having taken upon itself the inordinate burden of maintaining order along the borders of the former USSR, Russia is currently maintaining more troops abroad (including border guards) than any other country in the world.

After the Civil War, at the beginning of the period of the New Economic Policy, Lenin reduced the Army from 5 million to 550,000. That is, by almost 10 times. But this took more than just a single year. As of the moment of their establishment by an edict of the Russian president

dated 7 May 1992, the Armed Forces numbered around 3 million persons. By 1995 their numerical strength is supposed to be not more than 2 million. But such a downward progression is not to be observed. On the contrary the administrative machinery of the Russian Ministry of Defense seems to have already surpassed that which existed in the Soviet Army in terms of both number of workers and quantity of general-grade positions.

The equipment situation is also critical. Of the five and a half thousand tanks in the Russian Army, around a thousand are practically unusable. During the next year half of the tanks will become obsolete from a military standpoint. There is nothing with which to replace them. Of 7,000 infantry fighting vehicles and 6,500 artillery systems, over a third require immediate overhaul. The full thousand of our helicopter gunships require immediate repairs and maintenance. This list can go on and on. And even so, these are nothing more than the general statistics. Behind each one of them stands the tragedy of people deprived of the possibility of doing their work. In many of the units, all of this is believed to be the result of intrigues by our enemies, conspiracies, and betrayal. Here and there, we hear appeals for action: "...could it be that our commanders have an aversion to rendering foreign uniforms with Russian bayonets?" Young, hot-blooded lieutenants can't understand why everyone is calmly watching as things of value that had taken years to create are being destroyed, turned inside out, and sold for a pittance in a single moment.

How many packs of chewing gum can you get for a gyro-stabilized strategic nuclear missile launcher, or for a mobile army command post? That's not an idle question. Such deals have been made.

Yes, Russia has always traded in arms. Just in the 1980s for example, the military-industrial complex sold over 6,000 tanks, 20,000 guns, 17 submarines and thousands of airplanes to foreign countries. Through its weapon sales the USSR controlled the geopolitical map of the world, shored up and set up regimes, and maintained or relieved tension in certain regions. But the process was kept under meticulous control, and the weapons were carefully accounted for. Each cartridge was accountable. The loss of a single pistol was considered to be an incident of the gravest import, one to be reported to the Main Command.

Following disintegration of the USSR, the Army wrote off around a third of all of its military equipment and armament within a year. It was scrapped, hidden, and stolen for subsequent sale. But in order to sell weapons thoughtlessly, you first have to sell your conscience. Who knows how many tens of dollars the conscience of a Russian officer costs today?

Whether the authors of the doctrine like it or not, the individual, along with his own philosophy and interests, remains the decisive factor of modern warfare. It is no secret to anyone that all of the world's large armies invest enormous resources into shaping a sense of patriotism in their soldiers, a system of spiritual values and particular political convictions (no matter what anyone says about depoliticizing the Army). All of this is accomplished through a system of indoctrination, which exists in every army of every state. Indoctrination is an attribute of an

army, a means of controlling the armed forces. I know of very few exceptions to this rule, and when it gets down to the large armed forces and countries, there is but one exception—Russia. The destruction of our old system of military indoctrination is almost complete, and it is continuing. Listen to what I'm saying—it is not being changed, it is not being reworked, but it is being destroyed. The former system was of course oversaturated by ideology, it totally excluded creativity, and it was built on a purely Talmud-like foundation. But at least it was well-conceived, and army indoctrination consistently shaped the army's culture, which was rooted in Soviet traditions and customs. They were expressed in the form of numerous military customs and courtesies, from the simplest—saluting—to the most complex—the military oath taken in a solemn situation, holiday parades, and so on. Having become divested of the ideological principles of communism, the once perfect system of troop indoctrination immediately lost meaning, and transformed into the tattered clothing of the army. This process was helped along considerably by organizational measures directed at the former Main Political Directorate: hatchet-job reorganizations and personnel changes in the Directorate for Educational Work With Personnel, persecution of political workers in the forces, and many other clumsy actions by Armed Forces reformers. Together with the old system of indoctrination, the Army reformers did in all of military culture. No one gave any thought to what was to replace it. The Russian Army does not have its own internal military culture. It is attempting to unconditionally inject new political meaning into old army customs and courtesies, and it is trading Soviet flags for Russian ones, but all of the customs, all of the courtesies are rigidly determined by their traditional communist content, and nothing new is being added. And without internal army culture, it would be naive to discuss organization and combat readiness of the armed forces. No one has yet suggested a system for the army under which people would be brought together not by a dependence upon an idea, but by the idea itself. And without unity, without unity of thought, it is impossible to have a modern army.

Let me also add that all indoctrination is inseparable from the training process. Because officers and generals didn't know how to indoctrinate their subordinates, or in what, they have lost their possibility for teaching them military affairs per se in organized, high quality fashion.

How did it happen that the undermined socioeconomic and moral tenets of the Army went unreflected on the

pages of this important state document? How is the highly important formula of defense going to work? How about the formula of victory? The important thing now is, who's victory over whom?

What makes the new military doctrine fundamentally different is that it gives the president and government the right to use the Armed Forces to fight not only a foreign but even an internal foe. To put it simply, this military doctrine gives the Army permission to shoot at civilians, to use mighty army weapons against them. It may be possible that they will now begin giving combat decorations for this.

The unprecedented level of freedom that the authors of the doctrine give to the military-political leadership (or leader) in independently choosing the adversary both outside the state and within it is simply frightening.

The military has been given unlimited possibilities, and it has been shown unprecedented trust. But thank God, this is no joy to officers. They have no wish to shoot at civilians, no matter what their convictions, no matter what their behavior. If someone violates the law, we have the militia, the OMON [Special Purpose Militia Detachments], and the security service. Why the military? The Army is supposed to fight another army, and not anyone else. This unique feature of the military doctrine explains to some degree all of its preceding contradictions. If the Armed Forces are to be used to fight an internal enemy, the absence of many concepts from the doctrine familiar to military people is fully natural and justified. A ministry that is bent on force, and takes aim into its own country, has need of neither the sociopolitical nor the military-technical side of policy. A ministry of this kind has other objectives, a different system of preparation. True, in civilized countries the army does not perform internal functions. In Czarist Russia for example, such functions were performed by a gendarmerie. And it did quite well without military doctrine.

But even in instructions followed by the gendarmerie, the probable adversary, the potential violator of the peace, was clearly defined. He was an anarchist or a social-democrat, a socialist-revolutionary or a Bundist. Do those who wrote this present doctrine realize that by not indicating any probable adversary within the country, they have thus wittingly or unwittingly fingered all political parties, all social groups as the probable adversaries of the Armed Forces? And doesn't that mean all of the Russian people?

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